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Abstract
A distributed system consists of processes communicating with each other through communi-
cation links. Recently, large scale networks have been developed, e.g. the Internet, ad-hoc
networks, sensor networks, inter-vehicle networks. As the number of processes grows, a dis-
tributed system is more prone to faults. Fault tolerance is one of the most challenging problems
in distributed systems and the design of fault-tolerant distributed protocols attracts more and
more attention. The e®ect of faults may spread over the entire network due to the communica-
tion among processes. In large scale networks, it is desired that the e®ect of a fault is contained
and does not contaminate the entire network. In addition, it is expected that the system recover
quickly so that the system can tolerate the next fault.
Self-stabilization is one of the most powerful design paradigms for non-masking fault tol-
erance in distributed systems. A self-stabilizing protocol promises autonomous adaptability
against any ¯nite number of transient faults that corrupt memory contents at processes. Fault-
containment has been attracted much attention in the area of adaptive stabilization. A fault-
containing self-stabilizing protocol promises containment of the e®ect of a small scale fault
in addition to self-stabilization against large scale faults. (In the following, we call it fault-
containing protocol.) Containment guarantees that the e®ect of a fault is contained around
faulty processes (spatial containment) and/or it lasts only a short period of time after the fault
(temporal containment). The notion of fault-containment is useful in practice. Self-stabilization
promises fault tolerance against any ¯nite number of transient faults, but guarantees nothing
during the stabilization, e.g. the e®ect of a small scale fault may spread over the entire system.
In practice, catastrophic faults rarely occur while small scale faults are more likely to occur
frequently. However, designing fault-containing protocols is generally di±cult. The di±culty
lies in the fact that it is di±cult and costly to detect faulty con¯guration and faulty processes
in distributed settings, while it is necessary for the containment of the e®ect of faults.
In this dissertation, we focus on the design of fault-containing protocols and propose a
framework that facilitates the design of new fault-containing protocols. We propose two methods
to realize hierarchical structures of fault-containing protocols that ease the design of new fault-
v
vi
containing protocols and that improves the reusability of existing protocols by extending their
applications.
First of all, we present fault-containing composition that provides a hierarchical composition
of fault-containing protocols with preserving the fault-containment property of source proto-
cols. In a hierarchical composition of two (or more) protocols, the output of one protocol (the
lower protocol) is used as the input to the other protocol (the upper protocol). Though several
hierarchical composition techniques for self-stabilizing protocols have been proposed, they can-
not preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols. The problem is that existing
composition techniques allow the upper protocol to be executed on the incorrect input from the
lower protocol and the e®ect of a fault may spread over the entire network in the upper protocol.
Our approach is to control the execution of source protocols so that the upper protocol stops
during the recovery of the lower protocol. The di±culty lies in how to guarantee the recovery
of the lower protocol when the upper protocol starts its execution. A fault-containing protocol
provides temporal containment and/or spatial containment that can be used to guarantee the
recovery of the protocol. We propose two types of fault-containing composition methods: to
guarantee the recovery of the lower protocol, one utilizes the temporal containment of source
protocols (Chapter 3), and the other utilizes the spatial containment of source protocols (Chap-
ter 4). Fault-containing composition is the ¯rst step to facilitate the design of fault-tolerant
protocols because it shows the possibility of a uniform composition framework for fault-tolerant
protocols.
Secondly, we present a simulation technique for fault-containing protocols on an embedded
topology. Topology embedding is to embed a virtual topology on a real topology, and this enables
a distributed protocol designed for a speci¯c topology to be executed on another topology. A one-
to-one node embedding is a topology embedding such that one real process corresponds to just one
virtual process. Any one-to-one node embedding has natural fault tolerance because when a real
process is corrupted by a fault, only one corresponding virtual process is corrupted in the virtual
topology. However, one-to-one node embedding introduces dilation (the maximum distance of a
virtual link in a real topology) bigger than one and the data on a virtual link may be corrupted
by a corruption of intermediate real processes. To preserve the fault-containment of original
protocols executed on the embedded topology, it is necessary that the data on a virtual link is
not corrupted. As one of the most investigated networks in distributed computing, a ring network
is frequently used for distributed computation and control. We focus on ring embedding on a
rooted tree and propose a simulation technique for fault-containing ring protocols on an arbitrary
rooted tree (Chapter 5). The proposed simulation technique demonstrates the possibility of a
universal simulation technique for fault-tolerant protocols executed any embedded topologies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Distributed Systems
A distributed system consists of computational entities that communicate with each other by
communication links. (We call each computational entity process in the following.) Processes
cooperate to accomplish the objectives of the system. Distributed systems model communication
networks, multiprocessing computers, multitasking single computers, etc. There are fundamen-
tal expectations in designing distributed systems and distributed protocols, e.g. performance,
scalability, availability, resource sharing, dependability, fault tolerance.
The di±culty in designing distributed systems lies in the distributed nature itself. The whole
system should achieve its objectives, while each process has to compute with limited information
about the entire system, e.g. the number of processes, topology of the network, independent
input at each processes, asynchrony in the computation at each process or message delivery, and
failures of many types.
Recently, the application of distributed systems has been growing rapidly, e.g. the Internet,
peer-to-peer networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, sensor networks, inter-vehicle networks. These
new applications introduce novel requirements on distributed systems. The Internet and peer-
to-peer networks consist of a huge number of computers in the world. As the size of a network
grows, dynamic changes (e.g. faults and topology changes) occur more frequently. The e®ect
of a change may spread over the entire network due to the communication among processes.
For example, a non-faulty process is a®ected by a fault by communicating with faulty processes
and updating its state according to the information exchanged, and the e®ect may keep on
spreading in the same way. This may damage the performance, availability, and dependability
of the system. It is necessary for the system to automatically adapt to the changes and to
prevent the e®ect of the changes from spreading over the entire network. Sensor networks
1
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consist of a large number of sensor nodes and they are often operated under harsh environment.
Thus, unexpected faults and topology changes can occur frequently. Because a large number
of sensor nodes are distributed over wide ¯eld, it is desirable that the system adapts to the
environment without human intervention. On the other hand, each sensor node has a small
processor and small battery capacity. The di®erence between sensor networks and the Internet
is this limitation on resource at each process. So, in sensor networks, it is desirable that the
adaptability is achieved with small computational overhead. Inter-vehicle networks are exposed
to dynamic topology changes and the biggest di®erence from above networks is mobile speed of
each process. In such networks, it is expected that the system adapts to fast-changing topology
quickly so that the system tolerates the next topology change.
1.2 Fault Tolerance of Distributed Systems
Distributed systems are prone to failures, e.g. memory contents at processes may be corrupted,
processes may behave arbitrarily and may stop their actions, and messages exchanged between
processes may be changed and lost. Fault tolerance is to mask the e®ect of failures or recover
the objective behavior of a system after failures. As distributed systems play more critical role,
fault tolerance of distributed systems is getting more and more important.
There are many levels of failures, e.g. hardware, software, process, communication. We focus
on failures at processes and they are classi¯ed into the following four types [21, 41].
² Crash failure. A process stops its actions permanently when it undergoes a crash failure.
² Omission failure. In a network such that processes send and receive messages with each
other, a receiver process does not receive some of the messages sent to it when it undergoes
an omission failure.
² Transient failure. A transient failure changes the states of some processes arbitrarily by
changing their memory contents arbitrarily.
² Byzantine failure. A Byzantine failure makes the process behave arbitrarily. This model
is the strongest model of all process failure models.
Useful properties of distributed systems are classi¯ed into either safety property or liveness
property [21, 41, 51]. Safety property implies that \bad things never happen" where bad things
mean abnormal behavior of the system. Formally, safety property addresses that the system
satis¯es its safety speci¯cation in any execution. Liveness property implies that \good things
eventually happen" where good things means the speci¯cation or purpose of the system. For-
mally, liveness property addresses that the system eventually satis¯es its speci¯cation in any
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execution. The term eventuality means a ¯nite time, i.e. ¯nite actions or computations. It
is desirable that distributed systems always satisfy both safety property and liveness property.
However, when failure occurs, these properties may be no longer satis¯ed. To design fault-
tolerant distributed systems, it is necessary to guarantee that at least one of these properties is
always satis¯ed even when failures occur.
There exist many approaches to promise fault tolerance. These approaches are classi¯ed into
the following three types [21, 51].
² Masking tolerance. Masking tolerance promises that the application of the system
does not observe the e®ect of failures and the system always satis¯es its speci¯cation.
Hence, the system always satis¯es safety property and liveness property even when there
exist failures.
² Non-masking tolerance. Non-masking tolerance allows that the application is tempo-
rally a®ected after failures, but eventually the e®ect ceases and the system behaves as its
speci¯cation. Hence, the system always satis¯es liveness property, however, when there
exist failures, it does not promise safety property.
² Fail-safe tolerance. Fail-safe tolerance just avoids critical faulty con¯gurations that
damage the application, and even when failures occur, fail-safe tolerance may allow faulty
con¯gurations if it does not a®ect the application. Hence, the system always satis¯es safety
property, however, when there exist failures, it does not promise liveness property.
Masking fault tolerance is more preferable, however it is costly to implement masking fault-
tolerant distributed systems. Non-masking fault tolerance provides a reasonable way of imple-
menting fault-tolerant distributed systems.
1.3 Self-stabilization
To design fault-tolerant distributed systems, self-¤ properties attract increasing attention, e.g.
self-stabilizing, self-adaptive, self-con¯guring, self-healing, self-managing, self-organizing, self-
optimizing, self-repairing. Self-* properties promise that the system automatically adapts to
faults. Self-stabilization is one of the most promising design paradigms for adaptive fault-
tolerant distributed protocols.
1.3.1 Self-stabilization and Adaptive Stabilization
Dijkstra [13] ¯rst introduced the notion of self-stabilization in 1974. Self-stabilization provides
non-masking fault tolerance against ¯nite number of transient faults that corrupts processes
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by changing memory contents at processes arbitrarily. A self-stabilizing protocol promises that
starting from any arbitrary initial con¯guration, the system eventually converges to a legitimate
con¯guration where the protocol satis¯es its speci¯cation. Hence, for a ¯nite number of transient
faults, self-stabilization promises autonomous adaptability by considering the con¯guration after
the last fault as an initial con¯guration. A large number of self-stabilizing protocols have
been proposed for many problems, e.g. spanning tree construction [11, 19, 30], leader election
[22, 40], maximal independent set [50, 52], maximal matching [29, 42, 43], vertex coloring [28],
median ¯nding [9], synchronization [7, 32], propagation of information with feedback (PIF)
[10, 12], token circulation [31], TDMA slot assignment [28], and routing [8]. Good surveys are
found in [14, 20, 48, 50]. Self-stabilization is also widely used in real networks. IEEE 802.1d
spanning tree protocol enables Ethernet bridges to construct a spanning tree in a self-stabilizing
manner to avoid packet loops. RIP (Routing Information Protocol) based on Bellman-Ford
routing algorithm and OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) based on periodical refresh of routing
informations are also self-stabilizing.
Though self-stabilization achieves excellent fault tolerance against large scale faults, catas-
trophic faults rarely occur in practice while small scale faults are more likely to occur frequently.
Moreover, self-stabilization guarantees nothing during the stabilization, and the e®ect of a small
scale fault may spread over the entire network (Figure 1.1).
Many researchers have tried to develop adaptive self-stabilization by restricting the fault
scenario, e.g. fault-containment [22, 23], time-adaptive stabilization [36], superstabilization
[15, 34], local stabilization [1], and time-to-fault adaptive stabilization [16]. Fault-containment
guarantees that when a fault corrupts at most f processes in a legitimate con¯guration, the
system reaches a legitimate con¯guration in a time proportional in f . (The value of f depends
on the protocol.) Time-adaptive stabilization guarantees that after a fault corrupts processes in
a legitimate con¯guration, the system reaches a legitimate con¯guration in a time proportional
to the number of corrupted processes. Super-stabilization guarantees that the system keeps its
safety during the convergence after any topology change in a legitimate con¯guration. Local
stabilization promises that after a fault corrupts processes in a legitimate con¯guration, the
system reaches a legitimate con¯guration in a time proportional to the diameter of corrupted
region. Time-to-fault adaptive stabilization guarantees that the output of the protocol recovers
in a time proportional to the number of corrupted processes in an initial con¯guration. The
main issue is the time complexity for recovery. Their aim is to guarantee the recovery time
bounded by the number of corrupted processes in an initial con¯guration.
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Figure 1.1: Self-stabilization and fault-containment (Spanning tree construction)
1.3.2 Fault-containment
Ghosh et al. [22, 23] ¯rst introduced the notion of fault-containment in 1996. An f -faulty
con¯guration is a con¯guration obtained by a fault corrupting f processes in a legitimate con-
¯guration. An f -fault-containing protocol promises self-stabilization against large scale faults
and containment of the e®ect against small scale faults, i.e. for any f 0-faulty con¯guration,
where f 0 is smaller than or equals to f , the e®ect is contained in any execution starting from
the con¯guration. The containment property is twofold: one is spatial containment property
that promises that the e®ect of the fault is contained around faulty processes. The other is
temporal containment property that promises that the e®ect of the fault lasts just a short pe-
riod of time after the fault (Figure 1.1). There already exist many fault-containing protocols,
e.g. a small scale fault is contained and rapid recovery is guaranteed in the fault-containing
protocols for rings [22, 26], and for general graphs [23, 24, 25, 39]. Ghosh et al. proposed
fault-containing leader election on rings [22], k-fault-containing token circulation [26], 1-fault-
containing BFS tree construction [24], 1-fault-containing spanning tree construction [25], and
1-fault-containing maximal independent sets [39]. Some of the above fault-containing protocols
are obtained by adding fault-containment property to already existing self-stabilizing protocols.
Ghosh et al. present a general technique for adding 1-fault-containment property to non-reactive
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Figure 1.2: Hierarchical structure
self-stabilizing protocols [23]. Ghosh et al. introduced 1-fault-containing spanning tree construc-
tion using priority scheduler in [25]. Priority scheduler provides a weak priority rule that makes
the recovery actions of faulty processes precede the actions of correct processes. There exist
such fault-containing protocols obtained by composing multiple layers of protocols where each
protocol is not fault-containing by itself [4, 3]. However, these transformers are designed for
limited fault scenarios.
1.4 Hierarchical Design of Distributed Protocols
Hierarchical design of protocols improves the reusability of existing protocols by extending the
application of these protocols and eases the design of new protocols. Hierarchy means that
the output of one protocol (the lower protocol) is used as the input to the other protocol
(the upper protocol). For example, Figure 1.2 shows a hierarchical structure of two protocols
where the lower protocol is a spanning tree construction on an arbitrary graph and the upper
protocol is a ring embedding on an arbitrary tree. The tree constructed by the lower protocol
is used as the input by the upper protocol. In this dissertation, we focus on two types of
hierarchical design of self-stabilizing protocols. First, we introduce hierarchical composition of
self-stabilizing protocols that facilitates the design of new protocols. Secondly, we introduce
topology embedding that extends the application of existing protocols designed for a speci¯c
topology to another topology.
1.4.1 Composition
In a hierarchical composition of two (or more) distributed protocols, the output of one protocol
(the lower protocol) is used as the input to the other protocol (the upper protocol) and the
composite protocol provides the output of the upper protocol on the input to the lower protocol.
We call the lower protocol and the upper protocol source protocols. Hierarchical composition
eases the design of new protocols and improves the reusability of existing protocols.
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Hierarchical composition of fault-tolerant distributed protocols has been well studied. Gouda
et al. proposed an adaptive programming for the systems with input changes [27]. They proposed
hierarchical composition of adaptive protocols that forces each process to execute the lower
protocol ¯rst so that the process executes the upper protocol after the lower protocol. Their
hierarchical composition checks whether a process has to execute the lower protocol and only
when it does not have to execute the lower protocol, the process can execute the upper protocol.
However, in general, this local checking of the lower protocol cannot guarantee completion of
the global recovery of the lower protocol when the upper protocol starts its execution.
Hierarchical composition of self-stabilizing protocols is also well used in the design of new
self-stabilizing protocols. One of the most well-known composition techniques for self-stabilizing
protocols is fair-composition [17, 19]. Fair-composition executes source protocols in parallel and
it guarantees that the composite protocol is also self-stabilizing. Starting from an arbitrary
initial con¯guration, the lower protocol ¯rst reaches a legitimate con¯guration with its self-
stabilizing property. Though the upper protocol can be also executed on the incorrect input
from the lower protocol during the convergence of the lower protocol, self-stabilization guarantees
convergence from any initial con¯guration. Hence, after the lower protocol reaches a legitimate
con¯guration, the upper protocol eventually reaches a legitimate con¯guration and the composite
protocol eventually reaches a legitimate con¯guration.
Other than hierarchical structures, many composition techniques for self-stabilizing protocols
have been also developed. Gouda et al. [27] also proposed selective composition that executes
multiple adaptive protocols and switches the output so that the composite protocol can adapt
to input changes. Beauquier et al. [6] introduced cross-over composition which uses the lower
protocol as a ¯lter to the execution of the upper protocol and improves the adaptability to
scheduler. Dolev et al. [16] proposed parallel composition that enables parallel search and
accelerates the stabilization by executing multiple self-stabilizing protocols in parallel.
1.4.2 Topology Embedding
Topology embedding is to embed a virtual topology on a real topology that enables a distributed
protocol designed for a speci¯c topology (virtual topology) to be executed on another topology
(real topology) and extends the application of the protocol.
We can ¯nd two types of topology embedding 1. Many-to-one node embedding is an em-
1We can ¯nd one-to-many node embedding in [47]. In [47], Nolte et al. proposed virtual node layer for mobile
ad-hoc networks that deploys virtual nodes on the prede¯ned geographic coordinates. Virtual nodes are realized
by the mobile nodes around the prede¯ned points. Thus, virtual node layer enables stable deployment of virtual
nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks even when mobile nodes move.
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(a) Many-to-one node embedding (b) One-to-one node embedding
Figure 1.3: Virtual ring embedding on a rooted tree
bedding such that one real process corresponds to multiple virtual processes. One-to-one node
embedding is an embedding such that one real process corresponds to just one virtual process
and di®erent real processes correspond to di®erent virtual processes. Figure 1.3 shows an ex-
ample of ring embedding on a rooted tree. Based on the depth-¯rst traversal, Figure 1.3 (a)
shows a many-to-one node embedding while Figure 1.3 (b) shows a one-to-one node embedding.
Consider a fault that corrupts one real process in Figure 1.3. In many-to-one node embedding,
corresponding multiple virtual processes are corrupted in the virtual topology. On the other
hand, in one-to-one node embedding, just one corresponding virtual process is corrupted in the
virtual topology. In this way, any one-to-one node embedding has natural fault tolerance because
when a fault corrupts f real processes, it corresponds to a situation where f virtual processes
are corrupted by the fault in the virtual topology. To preserve the fault-containment property
in the virtual topology, this fact is very useful because the containment guarantee depends on
the number of processes corrupted by a fault.
However, in a one-to-one node embedding, each virtual link between two virtual processes
may be a path between corresponding real processes in the real topology. Dilation is the maxi-
mum distance of a virtual link in the real topology. A one-to-one node embedding can introduce
dilation larger than one. For example, Sekanina [49] proposed one-to-one node embedding for
ring on an arbitrary tree that has the dilation of three. Hence, each data read through (or
sent and received on) a virtual link should be relayed by the intermediate processes in a real
topology. When a real process is corrupted by a fault, the virtual links running through the
corrupted process can be also corrupted. However, in general, fault tolerance against unreliable
communication links is easier than fault tolerance against corruption at processes. For example,
by duplicating messages or attaching sequence numbers to messages, we can avoid message loss
or message duplication.
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1.5 Overview of This Dissertation
In this dissertation, we focus on hierarchical design of fault-containing protocols that facil-
itates the design of new fault-containing protocols and extends the application of existing
fault-containing protocols. We propose two methods to realize hierarchical structures of fault-
containing protocols.
1.5.1 Hierarchical Composition of Fault-containing Protocols
When designing hierarchical composition of fault-containing protocols, the main concern is to
preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols. Though several composition meth-
ods for self-stabilizing protocols have been proposed [17, 19, 27], existing composition methods
do not preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols. Fair composition [17, 19]
of self-stabilizing protocols cannot preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols.
This is because the parallel execution of the source protocols allows the upper protocol to be
executed on an incorrect output of the lower protocol. Then, the e®ect of a fault may spread
over the entire network in the upper protocol. Hierarchical composition [27] of self-stabilizing
protocols also cannot preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols. Hierarchical
composition just checks whether a process has to execute the lower protocol (i.e. whether it has
an enabled guard in the lower protocol) and only when it does not have to execute the lower
protocol, the process can execute the upper protocol. The problem is that we cannot guarantee
the overall recovery of the lower protocol by checking whether one process has an enabled guard
in the lower protocol or not. The di±culty in composing fault-containing protocols lies in how
to guarantee the recovery of the lower protocol when processes execute the upper protocol.
For any f1-fault-containing protocol P1 and f2-fault-containing protocol P2, a hierarchical
composition of P1 and P2 is a fault-containing composition when the composite protocol is f1;2-
fault-containing for some 0 < f1;2 · f1; f2. We propose Recovery Waiting Fault-containing Com-
position (RWFC ) strategy that stops the upper protocol during the recovery of the lower pro-
tocol. To implement RWFC strategy, we utilize the containment properties of fault-containing
protocols. Temporal containment property provides the recovery time that is the maximum
time necessary for the system to recover from any target faulty con¯guration. The ¯rst compo-
sition technique RWFC-LNS (RWFC with the local neighborhood synchronizer) stops the upper
protocol for the recovery time of the lower protocol. After its recovery time, the lower proto-
col is in a legitimate con¯guration, and the upper protocol recovers with its fault-containment
property. We also implement the local neighborhood synchronizer (LNS ) that measures time in
asynchronous distributed systems while preserving the spatial and temporal containment (i.e.
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LNS is executed only around faulty processes and only a short period of time after the fault).
However, in the worst case, RWFC-LNS stops the upper protocol even when the lower protocol
has recovered. Moreover, not all fault-containing protocols provide both temporal containment
property and spatial containment property. They just provide temporal containment property
and/or spatial containment property. Spatial containment property provides the inconsistency
range that is the maximum distance from any faulty process to any process that ¯nds incon-
sistency during the recovery of the protocol. The second composition technique RWFC-IcD
(RWFC with inconsistency detector) utilizes the inconsistency range to detect the recovery of
the lower protocol. RWFC-IcD enables the upper protocol to start its recovery as soon as the
lower protocol recovers and speeds up the recovery of the composite protocol. We implemented
the inconsistency detector (IcD) that detects the inconsistency of the lower protocol.
The proposed composition techniques are important both theoretically and practically. These
composition techniques suggest the possibility of a uniform framework for composition of fault-
containing protocols and a novel design technique for fault-containing protocols.
1.5.2 Ring Embedding
As one of the most investigated networks in distributed computing, a ring network is frequently
used for distributed computation and control. Dijkstra designed the ¯rst self-stabilizing protocols
for ring networks (three mutual exclusion protocols in [13]). The election problem, one of the
most fundamental problems, was ¯rst introduced by Le Lann for ring networks in a non-self-
stabilizing manner [38]. Fault-containing ring protocols are also proposed (leader election [22],
and token circulation [26]). A substantial advantage of ring protocols is that they can be applied
to arbitrary networks by means of virtual rings embedded on the real networks.
Kulkarni et al. proposed a transformation technique using a virtual ring embedded on a
spanning tree [35]. Their transformation enables self-stabilizing protocols designed for theoret-
ical models to be executed on a write all with collision (WAC) model. WAC model re°ects
collisions of broadcasts in sensor networks and a virtual ring is used for mutual exclusion to
avoid collisions. However, their ring embedding is a many-to-one node embedding.
One e®ective way of designing fault-containing protocols is to apply existing ones, designed
for simple networks (e.g. rings), to arbitrary networks. This approach is common in protocol
design. However, to the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been investigated in the
context of fault-containment.
We propose a one-to-one ring embedding on an arbitrary rooted tree that preserves the
fault-containment property of ring protocols executed on the embedded ring. To tolerate the
corruption of virtual links, we implement the communication mechanism that enables the cor-
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rupted data to be discarded at endpoint virtual processes.
Simulation is to provide the same task as an original protocol designed for a speci¯c com-
putation model on another computation model. Lynch de¯ned the simulation relation between
two di®erent protocols that requires one protocol traces every global con¯guration of the other
protocol [41]. In our ring embedding, it is di±cult to simulate the global con¯gurations of the
original ring protocol because virtual links have di®erent communication delays. However, our
method preserves the read/write causality of the original ring protocol that makes us call our
method causal simulation. Though causal simulation is a weaker notion than simulation, it is
strong enough to guarantee that the simulating protocol can execute the same task as the origi-
nal protocol. Causal simulation provides simulation of ring protocols for non-reactive tasks (e.g.
leader election, etc.) and reactive tasks (e.g. token circulation, etc.) such that the safety prop-
erty of the task depends only on the read/write causality. Since most of the reactive protocols
are based on read/write causality, causal simulation can be applied to a variety of protocols.
To the best of our knowledge, this ring embedding method is the ¯rst challenge to develop a
method to simulate a protocol on another topology while preserving the fault-containment prop-
erty. Using the fault-containing composition and existing fault-containing spanning tree con-
struction [24, 25], the proposed method can be extended to arbitrary networks. Consequently,
this work pioneers a new methodology of designing fault-containing protocols on arbitrary net-
works.
Though our framework focuses on the ring embedding on rooted trees, this embedding tech-
nique suggests the possibility of uniform topology embedding technique for simulating fault-
containing protocols.
1.6 Organization of This Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, we give formal de¯nitions of compu-
tational models and self-stabilization. In Chapter 3 and 4, we introduce the notion of fault-
containing composition and show two di®erent hierarchical composition techniques that pre-
serves the fault-containment property of source protocols. In Chapter 5, we show ring embed-
ding on an arbitrary rooted tree that preserves the fault-containment property of ring protocols
executed on an embedded ring. We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2
Preliminary
2.1 Network and Processes
A system is a network which is represented by a undirected graph G = (V;E) where the vertex
set V is a set of processes and the edge set E is a set of bidirectional communication links. Each
process has a unique identity. Process p is a neighbor of process q i® there exists a bidirectional
communication link (p; q) 2 E. A set of direct neighbors of p is denoted by Np and ±p = jNpj
is the degree of p. Let N1p = Np, and for each i ¸ 2, N ip = N i¡1p [
S
q2N i¡1p Nqnfpg. The set of
processes denoted by N ip is called i-neighbor of p. The i-neighbor of p is the set of processes such
that their distances from p are smaller than or equal to i excluding p. The distance between p
and q (q 6= p) is denoted by dist(p; q), and dist(p; q) = j i® q 62 N j¡1p ^ q 2 N jp .
Each process p maintains local variables and the values of all local variables at p de¯ne the
local state of p. Local variables are classi¯ed into three classes: input, output, and inner. The
input variables indicate the input to the system and they are not changed by the system. The
output variables are the output of the system for external observers. The inner variables are
internal working variables used to compute output variables.
We adopt locally shared memory model 1 as a communication model: each process p can read
the values of the local variables at q 2 Np [fpg. A protocol at each process p consists of a ¯nite
number of guarded actions in the form of hguardi ! hactioni. A hguardi is a boolean expression
involving the local variables of p and Np, and an hactioni is a statement that changes the values
of p's local variables (except input variables). A process with a guard evaluated to true is called
1There exist message passing model and link register model. In message passing model, processes communicate
with each other by sending and receiving messages. Link register model models each link as a register and each
message is written to and read from the register. However, the idea presented in this dissertation does not depend
on the communication model. Many researchers have tried to transform a protocol designed for the locally shared
memory model into a protocol on other communication models [19, 18, 53].
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enabled. We adopt distributed daemon as a scheduler: in a computation step, distributed daemon
selects a nonempty subset of enabled processes, and each selected process executes one of the
corresponding actions. We consider the distributed daemon is weakly fair, that is, if a process
evaluates some of its guards to be true in¯nitely often, the process is selected by the distributed
daemon in¯nitely often. The evaluation of guards and the execution of the corresponding action
is atomic: these computations are done without any interruption. A con¯guration of a system
is represented by a tuple of local states of all processes. An execution is a maximal sequence of
con¯gurations E = ¾0; ¾1; ¾2; ¢ ¢ ¢ that satis¯es (i) ¾i+1 is obtained by applying one computation
step to ¾i or (ii) ¾i is the ¯nal con¯guration. Maximality means that the sequence is either
in¯nite, or it is ¯nite and no process is enabled in the ¯nal con¯guration.
Distributed daemon allows asynchronous executions. In an asynchronous execution, the
time is measured by computation steps or rounds. Let E = ¾0; ¾1; ¾2; ¢ ¢ ¢ be an asynchronous
execution. The ¯rst round ¾0; ¾1; ¾2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¾i is the minimum pre¯x of E such that for each
process p 2 V if p is enabled in ¾0, either p's guard becomes disabled or p executes at least one
step in ¾0; ¾1; ¾2; ¢ ¢ ¢¾i. The second and latter rounds are de¯ned recursively by applying the
de¯nition of the ¯rst round to the remaining su±x of the execution E0 = ¾i+1; ¾i+2; ¢ ¢ ¢ .
2.2 Self-stabilization
A problem (task) T is de¯ned by a legitimate predicate on con¯gurations. A non-reactive
problem is a problem such that no process changes the values of its output variables after
the system reaches a con¯guration where the legitimate predicate holds, e.g. spanning tree
construction, and leader election. A reactive problem is a problem such that processes change
the values of their output variables after the system reaches a con¯guration where the legitimate
predicate holds, e.g. token circulation and synchronization.
There exist two types of de¯nitions for legitimacy. The di®erence is with what the legitimacy
is de¯ned: one de¯nes legitimacy based on con¯gurations and the other de¯nes legitimacy based
on executions. It is hard to de¯ne reactive problems by legitimacy de¯ned on con¯gurations.
For example, it is di±cult to determine liveness and fairness of the token circulation problem
with one con¯guration. For the token circulation problem, the legitimacy should be de¯ned with
executions.
De¯nition 1 Legitimate Con¯guration of Non-reactive Problems
For a non-reactive problem T , a con¯guration ¾ is legitimate i® ¾ satis¯es the legitimate
predicate of T .
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De¯nition 2 Legitimate Con¯guration of Reactive (and Non-reactive) Problems
For a reactive (and non-reactive) problem T 0, a con¯guration ¾ is legitimate i® any con¯guration
that appears in any execution starting from ¾ satis¯es the legitimate predicate of T 0.
We say a distributed protocol P (T ) has solved problem T in a con¯guration i® the con¯g-
uration satis¯es the legitimate predicate L(P (T )). The input (output) of P (T ) is represented
by the conjunction of input (output, respectively) variables at each process. We omit T if T is
clear. The input variables to the protocol are not changed during the execution of the protocol.
De¯nition 3 Self-stabilization
A distributed protocol P is self-stabilizing i® it satis¯es the following two properties:
² Convergence : starting from any arbitrary initial con¯guration, it reaches a legitimate
con¯guration.
² Closure : once it reaches a legitimate con¯guration, it remains in legitimate con¯gurations
thereafter.
A transient fault corrupts some processes by changing the values of their local variables (ex-
cept input variables) arbitrarily. A self-stabilizing protocol guarantees autonomous adaptability
against any ¯nite number of transient faults by considering the con¯guration after the last fault
as an arbitrary initial con¯guration from that it starts the convergence.
A con¯guration is f -faulty 2 i® the minimum number of processes such that we have to
change their local states (except input variables) to make the con¯guration legitimate is f . So,
an f -faulty con¯guration is the con¯guration just after a fault corrupts f processes. We say
process p is faulty i® we have to change p's local state to make the con¯guration legitimate and
otherwise correct.
An f-fault-containing protocol autonomously reaches a legitimate con¯guration from any f 0-
faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f) in a polynomial time in f , and/or the number of processes a®ected
is bounded by a polynomial in f , e.g. f , f2 (not jV j). We say a processes is contaminated i® the
process changes its local variables during the recovery from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f).
De¯nition 4 f-fault-containment
A self-stabilizing protocol is f-fault-containing i® it reaches a legitimate con¯guration from any
f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f) with the number of contaminated processes and/or the number
of rounds to reach a legitimate con¯guration bounded by some polynomial in f (not jV j).
2In general, the legitimate con¯guration obtained by changing the local states of f processes is not always
unique. However, in this dissertation we assume the corresponding legitimate con¯guration is unique because we
assume later that the legitimate con¯guration of the protocol is uniquely de¯ned by the input and the input is
not corrupted by faults.
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We simply denote an f -fault-containing self-stabilizing protocol as f -fault containing protocol.
Fault-containing protocols promise two types of containment, spatial containment and/or
temporal containment. The performance of an f -fault-containing protocol is measured by the
following criteria.
Stabilization :
² Stabilization time : the maximum (worst) number of rounds to reach a legitimate
con¯guration from an arbitrary initial con¯guration.
Spatial containment :
² Contamination radius : the maximum distance from any faulty process to the
process that changes its local state according to the faulty process during the recovery
from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f).
² Contamination number : the maximum (worst) number of contaminated processes
from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f).
Temporal containment :
² Recovery time : the maximum (worst) number of rounds to reach a legitimate
con¯guration from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f).
These performance criteria bound the e®ect after faults: starting from an arbitrary initial
con¯guration, the protocol has reached a legitimate con¯guration after its stabilization time.
Starting from an f 0- faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f), the protocol has reached a legitimate con¯g-
uration after its recovery time. Also, during the recovery from an f 0-faulty con¯guration, the
number of contaminated process is at most its contamination number or the distance from any
contaminated process to a faulty process that caused the contamination is at most its contami-
nation radius.
Chapter 3
Hierarchical Composition with
Temporal Containment
In this chapter, we present a timer-based hierarchical composition technique for fault-containing
protocols that preserves fault-containment property of source protocols. In a hierarchical com-
position of two (or more) distributed protocols, the output of one protocol (the lower protocol) is
used as the input to the other protocol (the upper protocol) and the composite protocol provides
the output of the upper protocol on the input to the lower protocol. We call the lower protocol
and the upper protocol source protocols. A composition is called fault-containing composition
if it preserves the fault-containment property of the source protocols.
The proposed strategy is to control the execution of source protocols. What we call RWFC
strategy (Recovery Waiting Fault-containing Composition) is to stop the upper protocol until
the lower protocol recovers so that the upper protocol recovers with a correct input from the
lower protocol. The di±culty lies in how to detect the recovery of the lower protocol.
The proposed composition technique utilizes temporal containment property of fault-contain-
ing protocols to control the execution of source protocols. We call the proposed composition
technique RWFC-LNS (RWFC with the Local Neighborhood Synchronizer). The recovery time
of a fault-containing protocol is the maximum time for the system to recover from a target
faulty con¯guration. We force the upper protocol to stop during the recovery time of the lower
protocol and the upper protocol always executes on the correct input from the lower protocol.
Thus, it is guaranteed that the upper protocol recovers with its fault-containment property
because it is suspended until the lower protocol recovers, and the composite protocol promises
fault-containment as a whole.
To implement RWFC-LNS, it is necessary to measure time in an asynchronous system in a
fault-containing manner. Our framework uses local timers at processes to measure the recovery
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times of the source protocols. Global synchronizers are often used to implement timers that
involve all processes into the synchronization. Ghosh et al. proposed a transformer for self-
stabilizing protocols to obtain corresponding 1-fault-containing protocols [23]. An obtained 1-
fault-containing protocol guarantees that the output of the protocol recovers quickly. However,
their transformer utilizes a global neighborhood synchronizer and the e®ect of a fault spreads over
the entire network via global synchronization. Though their transformer guarantees temporal
containment and spatial containment only for the output of the obtained protocol, the protocol
should wait the global synchronization to ¯nish so that it can tolerate the next fault. The global
neighborhood synchronizer cannot promise the spatial containment of the composite protocol
because it involves all processes into the synchronization. To preserve the fault-containment
property, we introduce a local neighborhood synchronizer that synchronizes a limited number
of processes during a short period of time after a fault without involving all processes into the
synchronization.
Related Works. One of the most commonly used hierarchical composition technique for
self-stabilizing protocols is fair composition. Fair composition executes two (or more) di®erent
self-stabilizing protocols in parallel and promises self-stabilization of the composite protocol [17].
However, if we compose fault-containing protocols by fair composition, the composite protocol
cannot preserve the fault-containment property of source protocols. This is because the parallel
execution of the source protocols allows the upper protocol to be executed on an incorrect output
of the lower protocol. Consider a fair composition of f1-fault-containing protocol P1 and f2-
fault-containing protocol P2. When a fault corrupts the output variables of the lower protocol
P1 at f processes (f · minff1; f2g), during the recovery of P1, the upper protocol P2 can be
executed in parallel to adopt the changes in the output variables of P1. During the recovery of
P1, processes around each faulty process may change their states (possibly) repeatedly in P1.
If they change the value of their output variables of P1, the input to P2 also changes. If the
number of such processes is greater than f2, P2 cannot guarantee fault-containment. Even when
the number of such processes is smaller than f2, if these processes change their outputs of P1
repeatedly, P2 cannot promise fault-containment. This is because a fault-containing protocol
assumes that the input does not change during the recovery.
Gouda et al. proposed adaptive programming for the systems with input changes [27]. They
proposed hierarchical composition of adaptive protocols that forces the lower protocol to be
executed ¯rst so that it provides the stable input to the upper protocol. Their hierarchical
composition just checks whether a process has to execute the lower protocol (i.e. whether it has
an enabled guard in the lower protocol) and only when it does not have to execute the lower
protocol, the process can execute the upper protocol. Though self-stabilization is one subclass
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of adaptive protocols, hierarchical composition of self-stabilizing protocols cannot preserve the
fault-containment property of source protocols. The problem is that we cannot guarantee the
overall recovery of the lower protocol by locally checking whether one process has an enabled
guard in the lower protocols or not.
These existing composition techniques cannot preserve the fault-containment property of
source protocols because they do not guarantee the recovery of the lower protocol when the
upper protocol is executed, and the e®ect of a fault can spread over the entire network in the
upper protocol.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we ¯rst give the formal de¯nition of the
fault-containing composition and introduce RWFC strategy. In Section 3.2, we show assump-
tions on the source protocols for RWFC-LNS. In Section 3.3, we ¯rst de¯ne the speci¯cation of
the local neighborhood synchronizer and then present the composition framework RWFC-LNS.
The correctness proof of RWFC-LNS is also shown in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present
an implementation of the local neighborhood synchronizer, protocol LNS and prove that LNS
satis¯es the speci¯cation in Section 3.3. We conclude this chapter with Section 3.5.
3.1 Fault-containing Composition and RWFC Strategy
We consider self-stabilization and fault-containment of protocols for non-reactive problems.
Hence, the set of legitimate con¯gurations of a problem is de¯ned by De¯nition 1.
A hierarchical composition of two protocols P1 and P2 is denoted by (P1 ¤ P2) where the
variables of P1 and those of P2 are disjoint except that the input to P2 is the output of P1. We
de¯ne the output variables of (P1 ¤P2) is the output variables of P2. A legitimate con¯guration
of (P1 ¤ P2) is de¯ned by L((P1 ¤ P2)) where L(P1 ¤ P2) = L(P1) ^ L(P2).
De¯nition 5 Fault-containing composition
Let P1 be an f1-fault-containing protocol and P2 be an f2-fault-containing protocol. A hierarchical
composition (P1 ¤P2) is a fault-containing composition of P1 and P2 i® (P1 ¤P2) is an f1;2-fault-
containing protocol for some f1;2 such that 0 < f1;2 · minff1; f2g.
We call P1 and P2 the source protocols. Fault-containing composition preserves the fault-
containment property of source protocols because 0 < f1;2 · minff1; f2g holds for an f1-fault-
containing protocol P1 and an f2-fault-containing protocol P2.
In a hierarchical composition, the input to P2 can be corrupted by a fault when the fault
corrupts the output variables of P1.
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Remark 1 For a hierarchical composition (P1 ¤ P2), the input to P1 is not corrupted by any
fault.
The input to P1 is given as the input variables at each process and we de¯ned the input variables
are not changed by any fault. Generally, fault-containment for non-reactive problems is designed
under the assumption that the input to the protocol is not changed by the fault. The input to
P1 is considered as the system parameters, e.g. topology, ID of each process, etc.
For fault-containing composition, we consider a subclass of fault-containing protocols ¦
such that each f -fault-containing protocol P 2 ¦ satis¯es Assumption 1. Many existing fault-
containing protocols [22, 25] satisfy this assumption.
Assumption 1 The legitimate con¯guration of P is uniquely de¯ned by the input variables.
Consider a composition (P1¤P2) of an f1-fault-containing protocol P1 and an f2-fault-containing
protocol P2. Starting from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · minff1; f2g), if the output of P1
after P1 reaches a legitimate con¯guration is di®erent from what it was before the fault, then
the input to P2 is considered to change and it may appear to be an f 0-faulty con¯guration for
some f 0 > minff1; f2g. Then, P2 cannot guarantee fault-containment even though the original
fault is small enough for the fault-containment of P2. Because the input to P1 is not changed
by any fault (Remark 1), Assumption 1 guarantees that P1 recovers to the unique legitimate
con¯guration and ensures the possibility of fault-containment in the composite protocol.
Our approach to fault-containing composition is to control the execution of P1 and P2 to
guarantee the recovery of P1 when P2 starts its execution. We call this approach Recovery
Waiting Fault-containing Composition (RWFC ).
De¯nition 6 RWFC strategy
RWFC strategy is to stop the execution of P2 until P1 provides a correct output when (P1 ¤ P2)
starts from a target faulty con¯guration.
To preserve the fault-containment (i.e. spatial containment and/or temporal containment) of
source protocols, the implementation of RWFC strategy should have the following property.
Remark 2 A composing protocol that realizes fault-containing composition should be also fault-
containing.
RWFC strategy preserves the fault-containment of P1 and P2 in the following way: starting
from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), when P1 reaches its unique legitimate con¯guration
for the stable input 1, there are at most f faulty processes in P2. Then P2 can recover with its
1A fault cannot change the input variables of P1 (Assumption 1) and P1 reaches the unique legitimate con¯g-
uration (Assumption 1).
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fault-containment property and the whole composite protocol succeeds in containing the e®ect
of faults.
3.2 Preliminary
In this chapter, we consider self-stabilization and fault-containment of protocols for non-reactive
problems. Hence, the set of legitimate con¯gurations of a problem is de¯ned by De¯nition 1.
In this chapter, we consider a subclass of fault-containing protocols ¦ such that each f -
fault-containing protocol P 2 ¦ satis¯es Assumption 2 and 3. Many existing fault-containing
protocols [22, 25] satisfy these assumptions.
Assumption 2 The legitimate predicate L(P ) for P is represented in the form L(P ) ´ 8p 2
V : consp(P ). The predicate consp(P ) involves the local variables at p and its neighbors, and it
is de¯ned over the values of output, inner, and input variables.
We say process p is inconsistent i® consp(P ) is evaluated to false at p, otherwise consistent.
Because we work on non-reactive problems, the predicate consp(P ) is evaluated to false when
process p is enabled.
Assumption 3 In an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f), if a faulty process p is a neighbor of
correct process(es), at least one correct process q neighboring to p evaluates consq(P ) to false or
p evaluates consp(P ) to false.
For a faulty process p and a neighboring correct process q, consp(P ) (consq(P ), respectively)
involves the local variables at q and p. Because p is faulty, there can be some inconsistency
between the local state of p and that of q.
Assumption 4 The recovery time of f -fault-containing protocol P is larger than its contami-
nation radius and f .
Generally, the recovery time of an f -fault-containing protocol is not always larger than f and
the contamination radius in an asynchronous system. However, in synchronous systems, the
recovery time is always larger than f and the contamination radius. Because our composition
technique executes the source protocols in a synchronous manner, we put this assumption.
3.3 Composition Framework
Let P1 be an f1-fault-containing protocol and P2 be an f2-fault-containing protocol. Our goal
is to produce f1;2-fault-containing protocol (P1 ¤ P2) for f1;2 = minff1; f2g.
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Table 3.1: Notations for the source protocols and the composite protocol (RWFC-LNS )
protocol number of maximum faults recovery time contamination radius
P1 f1 r1 c1
P2 f2 r2 c2
(P1 ¤ P2) f1;2 = minff1; f2g r1;2 c1;2
In this chapter, we use the notations shown in Table 3.1.
RWFC strategy is a strategy for fault-containing composition: P2 should wait the recovery of
P1. The key is how to guarantee the recovery of P1. To implement RWFC strategy, the proposed
fault-containing composition utilizes the recovery time of fault-containing protocols. Starting
from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), if a process ¯nds inconsistency in P1 or P2, the process
stops the execution of P2 at processes in the contamination radius of P1 and P2 for r1 rounds.
(Note that the inconsistency in P2 may be caused by the corruption of output variables of P1.)
During the r1 rounds, these processes execute only P1 and P1 reaches a legitimate con¯guration.
After that, these processes execute P2 on the correct input from P1.
To make the composite protocol fault-containing, it is necessary that all processes in the con-
tamination radius from each faulty process measure time from f -faulty con¯guration, i.e. these
processes need local timers. We implement local timers at processes with a local neighborhood
synchronizer that synchronizes the processes in maxfc1; c2g-neighbors for each faulty process
for (r1 + r2) rounds.
The idea of our composition is as follows: from Assumption 3, in an f -faulty con¯guration
(f · f1;2), if faulty process p has a correct process q in its neighbor, p or q ¯nds the inconsistency
between them in P1 or P2. The proposed composition technique utilizes this property. So, when
process s ¯nds inconsistency with its neighbor(s) in P1 or P2, it triggers the synchronization
of the local neighborhood synchronizer. The maximum distance from s to any contaminated
process is maxfc1; c2g +minff1; f2g + 1. (Note that the target faulty con¯guration is f -faulty
con¯guration for f · f1;2 = minff1; f2g.) Then, all processes in Nmaxfc1;c2g+minff1;f2g+1r are
involved in the synchronization and these processes execute P1 for the ¯rst r1 rounds and P2 for
the next r2 rounds.
For the fault-containment of the composite protocol, it is necessary that no correct process
executes P2 before P1 recovers. If a correct process executes P2 before P1 recovers, the number
of faulty processes in P2 may become larger than f2. On the other hand, we can allow faulty
processes to execute P2 before P1 reaches a legitimate con¯guration because in an f -faulty
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con¯guration (f · f1;2), even if faulty processes execute P2 before P1 recovers, the number of
faulty process in P2 is still no larger than f .
We ¯rst de¯ne the speci¯cation of the local neighborhood synchronizer in Section 3.3.1 and
show our composition framework in Section 3.3.2. The proof for the framework with the local
neighborhood synchronizer is shown in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Speci¯cation of the Local Neighborhood Synchronizer
In this section, we de¯ne the speci¯cation of the local neighborhood synchronizer for fault-
containing composition (P1 ¤ P2).
Speci¯cation 1 Stabilization
Each process p maintains a timer variable tp that takes an integer in [0::(r1 + r2)]. The local
neighborhood synchronizer is self-stabilizing and in a legitimate con¯guration, tp = 0 holds at
each p 2 V .
The local neighborhood synchronizer is implemented with a typical technique of synchronizers
[23]. We say a process is s-consistent i® its timer variable di®ers at most one with those at all
its neighbors involved in the synchronization. Synchronization is realized by making each timer
variable s-consistent and then decrementing it with preserving the s-consistency.
The local neighborhood synchronizer has the following two API for its application. Let k1;2
be maxfc1; c2g+minff1; f2g+ 1.
Speci¯cation 2 API
The following API is available at each process p 2 V for the application of the local neighborhood
synchronizer:
(i) start synch NS: when this function call is executed at process p, it starts the synchroniza-
tion involving k1;2-neighbors of p. These processes decrements their timer variables from
(r1 + r2) to 0 with keeping s-consistency and their timer variables take 0 in O(r1 + r2)
rounds.
(ii) exec NS: when this function call is executed at process p, if p is enabled in the local neigh-
borhood synchronizer, then it executes one of the corresponding actions, and if p decrements
tp, this function call returns true, otherwise false. If p is not enabled, then p does nothing
and this function call returns ?.
Starting from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), in the composite protocol, the variables
of P1, P2, and the local neighborhood synchronizer can be corrupted. In this case, the local
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neighborhood synchronizer starts its own recovery actions. However, the source protocols are ex-
ecuted according to the value of the timer variables. Thus, during the recovery actions, the local
neighborhood synchronizer should provide correct values of timer variables and synchronization
of timer variables at faulty processes.
Synchronization radius is the maximum distance between any faulty process and a process
involved in the synchronization caused by the faulty process. To keep the spatial containment
of the source protocols, the synchronization radius should be smaller than or equals to k1;2.
To keep the temporal containment of the source protocols, the local neighborhood synchronizer
makes these processes synchronize at most (r1 + r2) rounds.
In an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), tp = 0 always holds at correct process p because
the variables of correct processes were not corrupted by the fault. So, correct processes are
synchronized for (r1+r2) rounds by setting their timer variables (r1+r2) and then decrementing
it. However, it is di±cult to make faulty processes decrement their timer variables from (r1 +
r2) because of corruption of timer variables. From Assumption 3, when a faulty process p is
surrounded by other faulty processes, it cannot determine whether it is correct or not. If the
value of timer variables at p and all q 2 Np seem to be consistent (i.e. synchronized) with
values smaller than (r1+ r2), p may start to decrement tp from the value though it is corrupted
by a fault. In the composite protocol, this causes faulty processes to execute P2 before P1
recovers. However, as mentioned in the beginning of Section 3.3, this does not a problem for
the composition. What is important is that starting from an f -faulty con¯guration, correct
processes always count down their timer variables from (r1 + r2).
Speci¯cation 3 Synchronization
Starting from an f-faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), the local neighborhood synchronizer provides
the following ¯ve properties:
(i) Spatial containment: synchronization radius is smaller than or equals to k1;2.
(ii) Temporal containment: the local neighborhood synchronizer reaches a legitimate con¯g-
uration in O(r1 + r2) rounds.
(iii) Synchronization: each processes involved in the synchronization decrements its timer
variable with keeping s-consistency.
(iv) Correct countdown: if a correct process counts down its timer variable, the timer variable
¯rst takes (r1 + r2).
(v) Initialization: if start synch NSis executed at process p, then each process in Nk1;2p are
involved in the synchronization started by p.
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3.3.2 Composition Protocol RWFC-LNS
Our composition framework RWFC-LNS (Fault-containing Composition with the Local Neigh-
borhood Synchronizer) is shown in Protocol 3:3:1.
Process p executes the guarded actions of the local neighborhood synchronizer by execut-
ing exec NS, and whenever it decrements tp, p executes the source protocols by executing the
procedure A(tp) that determines which source protocol is executed at p. If r2 · tp < r1 + r2 p
executes just P1, otherwise P2.
When p ¯nds inconsistency in P1 or P2 (consp(P1) = false or consp(P2) = false holds at p),
there exists a faulty process in Np [ fpg. If there exists a process that is not involved in the
synchronization in its neighbors and p (f9q 2 Np [ fpg : tq = 0g), p executes start synch NS
and initiates the synchronization of its k1;2-neighbors. Then, p and its k1;2-neighbors execute
P1 for r1 rounds. After that, they executes P2 on the correct input from P1 and P2 reaches the
legitimate con¯guration with its fault-containment property.
Protocol 3.3.1 RWFC-LNS for (P1 ¤ P2)
Procedure A(tp) for process p
if(r2 · tp < r1 + r2) then execute P1
else execute P2
Action for process p
true ¡!
if(exec NS = true) then A(tp);
if(:consp(P1) _ :consp(P2)) ^ (9q 2 Np [ fpg : tq = 0)
then start synch NS
3.3.3 Correctness Proof of RWFC-LNS
First, we show the stabilization of RWFC-LNS (Lemma 1) and then, we show the f1;2-fault-
containment of RWFC-LNS (Theorem 1).
Lemma 1 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, RWFC-LNS eventually reaches the
legitimate con¯guration.
Proof. Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, the local neighborhood synchronizer
eventually reaches its legitimate con¯guration (Speci¯cation 1). After that, if P1 is not in a
legitimate con¯guration, then there exists at least one process p that evaluates consp(P1) to
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false. Then, process p executes start synch NS and initiates the synchronization and p can
execute P1 by executing A(tp) when it decrements tp. After the neighborhood synchronizer
reaches a legitimate con¯guration, if P1 has not reached its legitimate con¯guration, there exists
at least one process that initiates the synchronization by executing start synch NS. Until P1
reaches its legitimate con¯guration, P1 is executes in this way. After P1 reaches a legitimate
con¯guration, if P2 is not in a legitimate con¯guration, then there exists at least one process
q that evaluates consq(P2) to false. Then, process q executes start synch NS and initiates the
synchronization and q can execute P2 by executing A(tq) when it decrements tq. In the same
way as the stabilization of P1, P2 eventually reaches its legitimate con¯guration. Consequently,
RWFC-LNS eventually reaches a legitimate con¯guration. 2
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 RWFC-LNS provides a minff1; f2g-fault-containing protocol (P1 ¤P2) for f1-fault-
containing protocol P1 and f2-fault-containing protocol P2. The contamination radius of the
obtained protocol is O(maxfc1; c2g+minff1; f2g). The recovery time of the obtained protocol is
O(r1 + r2).
Proof. From Lemma 1, RWFC-LNS is self-stabilizing. In the following, we present the f1;2-
fault-containment of RWFC-LNS.
In an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), for each faulty process p, there exists at least one
faulty process q 2 Nminff1¡1;f2¡1gp that is neighboring a correct process. Let this correct process
be r. In an f -faulty con¯guration, tr takes 0 because it is not corrupted by the fault. Also, from
Assumption 3, in an f -faulty con¯guration, at least one of the following predicates is evaluated
to false: consq(P1), consq(P2), consr(P1), and consr(P2). We have the following two cases:
Case 1: If r ¯nds inconsistency in the source protocols (consr(P1) or consr(P2) is evaluated to
false), r executes start synch NS because tr takes 0 in the f -faulty con¯guration. After
that, from the initialization property in Speci¯cation 3, each s 2 Nk1;2r is involved in the
synchronization. From Nmaxfc1;c2gp ½ Nk1;2r , each process s 2 Nmaxfc1;c2gp counts down ts
from (r1 + r2) to 0.
Case 2: If r does not ¯nd inconsistency in the source protocols (consr(P1) and consr(P2) are
evaluated to true), consq(P1) or consq(P2) is evaluated to false at q. In this case, q executes
start synch NS because tr takes 0 in the f -faulty con¯guration. After that, from the
initialization property in Speci¯cation 3, each s 2 Nk1;2q is involved in the synchronization.
From Nmaxfc1;c2gp ½ Nk1;2r , each process s 2 Nmaxfc1;c2gp counts down ts from (r1+ r2) to 0.
Thus, in both cases, all processes in Nmaxfc1;c2gp are involved in the synchronization. Once a
process is involved in the synchronization, it decrements its timer variable from (r1 + r2) to 0.
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For the ¯rst r1 rounds, the process executes only P1 and for the latter r2 rounds, it executes
only P2. Thus, each process in N
maxfc1;c2g
p executes P2 on the correct input from P1.
A faulty processes can execute P2 before P1 recovers when it is surrounded by other faulty
processes and the timer variables happen to be consistent. We can treat the resulting state
from the execution of P2 as one that is obtained by the original fault as long as no correct
process executes P2 before the recovery of P1, i.e. no correct process is contaminated in P2
by this execution of P2 at faulty processes. The correct countdown property in Speci¯cation 3
guarantees that each correct process starts to decrement its timer variable from (r1+r2). So, each
correct process executes P1 for the ¯rst r1 rounds and P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration.
After that, it executes P2 on the correct input from P1 for the remaining r2 rounds. Hence, even
if faulty processes executes P2 before P1 recovers, it does not damage the fault-containment of
whole composite protocol.
After one round, no process executes start synch NS because there exists no faulty process
neighboring a correct process with a timer variable of value 0. The synchronization takes O(r1+
r2) rounds to terminate. Thus, the overall recovery time is O(r1 + r2).
Because start synch NS is executed just at faulty processes and some correct processes neigh-
boring a faulty process and other correct processes never execute start synch NS, the contami-
nation radius of the composite protocol is O(maxfc1; c2g+minff1; f2g).
Before the synchronization is initiated by some process that detects inconsistency in the
source protocols, the local neighborhood synchronizer may start its own recovery actions because
of the corruption on its variables. However, the contamination is contained in k1;2 radius for each
faulty process (spatial containment property in Speci¯cation 3) and the contamination ends in
O(r1+ r2) rounds (temporal containment property in Speci¯cation 3). Thus, the contamination
is contained.
Hence, Protocol 3:3:1 provides an f1;2-fault-containing protocol (P1 ¤ P2). 2
3.4 Local Neighborhood Synchronizer
In this section, we present an implementation of the local neighborhood synchronizer in Section
3.4.1 and prove that LNS satis¯es the Speci¯cation 1, Speci¯cation 2, and Speci¯cation 3 in
Section 3.4.2 and Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Protocol LNS
For any given M and k, protocol LNS provides the synchronization of M rounds among k-
neighbors of a process when the process gives the initialization signal by start synch NS. The
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synchronization consists of three phases. In the ¯rst phase, the shortest path tree (SPT) of
depth k and rooted at the process is constructed so that all the k-neighbors of the process are
involved into the synchronization. Then, in the second phase, the synchronized countdown of
timer variables takes place among these processes. In the third phase, the shortest path tree is
released from the root to the leaves.
Protocol LNS is shown in Protocol 3:4:1. Each process p has four variables, tp, dp, Predicateinitp
and retp: tp is the timer variable, dp is the depth variable which is used to construct the
SPT, and Predicateinitp and retp are boolean variables that are used to implement the API
de¯ned in Speci¯cation 2. Protocol LNS is self-stabilizing and in a legitimate con¯guration,
(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ Predicateinitp = false ^ retp = false) holds at each p 2 V .
API in Speci¯cation 2 is implemented as follows: When the application of LNS executes
start synch NS at process p, we assume it changes Predicateinitp from false to true. If the
predicate Predicateinitp = true holds at p, LNS changes the value of tp to M and dp to k.
After p executes LNS (and (tp = M ^ dp = k) holds), the application of LNS should change
Predicateinitp from true to false. The return value of exec NS is implemented with retp that
returns true i® the execution of LNS decrements tp, otherwise false.
We call process p a root i® the value of dp is locally maximum among its direct neighbors.
For each root process p, each non-root process q 2 Ndpp constructs the SPT rooted at p by setting
dq = dp¡ dist(p; q) where dist(p; q) denotes the distance between p and q. The parent(s) of q is
any neighbor r 2 Nq where dr = dq + 1. A process s 2 Nq is a child of q i® ds = dq ¡ 1.
Protocol LNS consists of seven guarded actions, S1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S7. Starting from an arbitrary
initial con¯guration, LNS allows process p, where tp = M holds in the initial con¯guration,
to become a root and to construct the SPT rooted at itself. When start synch NS is executed
at process p (Predicateinitp = true), p becomes a root of the SPT of depth k by executing S1.
When process q 2 Np ¯nds that the value of tq is smaller than M (Rp(1)) and it is neighboring
a process p with tp = M (Rp(2)), q executes S2 and change the value of tq to M and the value
of dq to dp¡ 1. A non-root process q 2 Ndpp is involved in the SPT tree rooted at p by executing
S2 (and S3 if necessary) and setting tq = M and dq = dp ¡ dist(q; p). Note that there may be
multiple root processes and each non-root process is involved in the SPT rooted at the nearest
root process. After (tq =M ^ dq = dp ¡ dist(p; q)) holds at q and all its neighbors get involved
in the shortest path tree, q goes into the second phase.
In the second phase, q decrements tq by executing S4 i® tq is synchronized with all its
neighbors (OK tq = true) and all its neighbors have involved in the SPT (OK dq = true). The
guard decq make the execution of S4 at q's parent precede the execution of S4 at q when the
value of the timer value takes the same value (Dq(1) and Dq(2)). So, the execution of S4 starts
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Protocol 3.4.1 LNS
Local variables at process p
tp: timer variable that takes a value in [0::M ]
dp: depth variable that takes a value in [0::k]
For API at process p
Predicateinitp : an input variable that takes a boolean value
retp: an output variable to the application that takes a boolean value
Predicates at process p
OK dp ´ f8q 2 Np : jdp ¡ dqj · 1g ^ f(9q 2 Np : dp = dq ¡ 1) _ (8q 2 Np : dp ¸ dq)g
OK tp ´ f(dp > 0) ^ (8q 2 Np : jtp ¡ tqj · 1)g_
f(dp = 0) ^ (8q 2 Np : (jtp ¡ tqj · 1 ^ dp = dq + 1) _ (dq = 0))g
raisep ´ Rp(1) ^Rp(2)
Rp(1) ´ (tp 6=M)
Rp(2) ´ f9q 2 Np : (tq =M) ^ (dq > 0) ^ :((tp =M ¡ 1) ^ (dp = dq + 1))g
maxdp ´Mp(1) ^Mp(2) ^Mp(3)
Mp(1) ´ (maxq2Npfdqg 6= 0) ^ (dp < maxq2Npfdqg ¡ 1)
Mp(2) ´ (dp 6= k) ^ :(8q 2 Np : dp > dq)
Mp(3) ´ f8q 2 Np [ fpg : tq =M _ (tq = 0 ^ dq = 0)g
decp ´ OK dp ^OK tp ^Dp(1) ^Dp(2)
Dp(1) ´ (tp > 0) ^ (8q 2 Np : tp ¸ tq)
Dp(2) ´ (8q 2 Np : tp = tq ! dp ¸ dq)
clrdp ´ Cp(1) ^ Cp(2)
Cp(1) ´ (tp = 0) ^ (8q 2 Np : tq = 0)
Cp(2) ´ (dp > 0) ^ f8q 2 Np : dp ¸ dq _ dq = 0g
rsetp ´ :raisep ^ :maxdp ^ :decp ^ :clrdp^
:(tp =M) ^ :(OK dp ^OK tp) ^ :(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0)
Actions for process p
S1 Predicate
init
p ¡! tp =M ; dp = k
S2 :Predicateinitp ^ raisep ¡! tp =M ; dp = maxq2Np^tq=Mfdqg ¡ 1
S3 :Predicateinitp ^maxdp ¡! dp = maxq2Npfdqg ¡ 1
S4 :Predicateinitp ^ decp ^ retp = false ¡! tp = tp ¡ 1; retp = true
S5 :Predicateinitp ^ clrdp ¡! dp = 0
S6 :Predicateinitp ^ rsetp ¡! dp = 0; tp = 0
S7 retp = true ¡! retp = false
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from the root process and spreads to the leaves in a top-down fashion. When q executes S4,
retq is changed from false to true and exec NS returns true. After that, q reset retq to false by
executing S7 before it executes S4 again. Note that the ¯rst phase and the second phase can
be executed in parallel but each process involved in the SPT start the second phase after all its
neighbors have ¯nished the ¯rst phase.
In the third phase, after all the neighbors ¯nish the countdown (Cq(1)), q executes S5 and
sets dq = 0. The execution of S5 also starts from the root and spreads to leaves (Cq(2)), and
the SPT is released. Eventually, the third phase ends and tq = 0 ^ dq = 0 holds at each q 2 V .
During the stabilization, if process p ¯nds that the guards raisep, maxdp, decp, clrdp are
all false or it is not waiting its neighbors to attend an SPT (:(tp = M)) or it is not waiting
its neighbors to decrement their timer variables (:(OK tp ^ OK dp)), it resets tp and dp by
executing S6. This behavior does not prevent the progress of above three phases.
3.4.2 Correctness Proof: Stabilization of LNS
In this section, we show the stabilization of LNS de¯ned in Speci¯cation 1. We ¯rst show the
behavior of LNS when LNS is started from an arbitrary initial con¯guration. In the following,
we assume that Predicateinitp is false and the application of LNS does not a®ect the behavior of
LNS. So, no process executes S1. We ¯rst focus on the SPTs constructed during the execution
and then we show the stabilization of the whole system with Lemma 7.
We ¯rst show that if the system is not in a legitimate con¯guration, there is at least one
process that executes a guarded action of LNS. Then, we show the stabilization of LNS. Starting
from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, the set of root processes of SPTs is determined by the
states of processes in the initial con¯guration. Process p can become a root process if tp = M
holds in the initial con¯guration (Lemma 3). For process p, let RN
k
p be the set of processes such
that q 2 Nkp [ fpg and tq = M holds in the initial con¯guration. So, RN
k
p is the set of possible
root processes in Nkp . Each non-root process p is involved in the SPT rooted at the nearest
root process in RN
k
p (Lemma 4). Then, p decrements tp and its neighbors also decrements their
timer variables (Lemma 5). Finally, p decrements tp from M with keeping s-consistency and tp
eventually reaches 0 (Lemma 6).
Lemma 2 For any con¯guration, if the con¯guration is not legitimate, at least one process has
an enabled guard and executes the corresponding action.
Proof. If a con¯guration is not legitimate, there exists at least one process p 2 V where
:(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ retp = false) holds. If retp = true holds, then p executes S7 and changes
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retp to false. In the following, we focus on the case where (:(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0) ^ (retp = false))
holds at p.
For contradiction, consider the case where all the guards of S2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S6 are evaluated to false
at all q 2 V in an illegitimate con¯guration. (We do not consider S1 because in this section, we
assume Predicateinitq = false always holds.) Thus, the following predicate holds at each q 2 V :
raiseq _maxdq _ decq _ clrdq_
f:raiseq ^ :maxdq ^ :decq ^ :clrdq
^ :(tq =M) ^ :(OK dq ^OK tq) ^ :(tq = 0 ^ dq = 0)g
=(raiseq _maxdq _ decq _ clrdq)_
f:(raiseq _maxdq _ decq _ clrdq)
^ :(tq =M) ^ :(OK dq ^OK tq) ^ :(tq = 0 ^ dq = 0)g
=false:
Because we assume S2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S6 are evaluated to false at q, (raiseq_maxdq_decq_clrdq) = false
holds. Thus, we obtain
false _ ftrue ^ :(tq =M) ^ :(OK dq ^OK tq) ^ :(tq = 0 ^ dq = 0)g
=false
So, (:(tq =M) ^ :(OK dq ^OK tq) ^ :(tq = 0 ^ dq = 0)) = false holds at each q 2 V .
By assumption, :(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0) holds at p. By above discussion, (tp = M) or (OK tp ^
OK dp) is true at p. We have the following two cases.
(i) tp =M : In this case, we have the following two cases:
(a) tq =M holds for all q 2 Np: In this case, we have the following two cases:
- jdp ¡ dqj · 1 holds for all q 2 Np: If dp ¸ dq for all q 2 Np, then p evaluates decp to
true. Otherwise, there exists process r 2 Np such that (dr > dp) and (tr = M) hold and
dr evaluates decr to true.
- jdp ¡ dqj > 1 holds for some q 2 Np: thus, q evaluates maxdq to true.
(b) tq < M holds for some process q 2 Np: At such process q, (OK dq ^ OK tq) or
(tq = 0^dq = 0) holds. If (OK dq^OK tq) holds at q, then (tq =M¡1) and (jdp¡dqj · 1)
hold and p evaluates decp to true. If (tq = 0 ^ dq = 0) holds at q, then q evaluates maxdq
to true.
(ii) OK dp ^OK tp: In this case, we have the following two cases:
(a) (8q 2 Np : tp ¸ tq) holds at p: If (8q 2 Np : tp = tq ! dp ¸ dq) holds at p, then decp
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is evaluated to true. Otherwise, there exists process q 2 Np such that (tp = tq ^ dp < dq)
holds. In this case, decq is evaluated to true at q.
(b) (9q 2 Np : tp < tq) holds at p: Let q be the process where (tq > tp) holds. Because
OK dp and OK tp holds at p, tq = tp+1. At process q, ((tq =M)_(OK dq^OK tq)_(tp =
0^dp = 0)) also holds. If (tq =M) holds at q, then q follows case (i). If (OK tdp^OK tq)
holds at q, q evaluates decq to true. Because tq is larger than tp(¸ 0), (tp = 0 ^ dp = 0)
does not hold at q.
Hence, there is contradiction and there exists at least one process that evaluates one of the
guards of S2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S6 to true and executes the corresponding action. 2
Lemma 3 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, if tp < M holds in the initial con-
¯guration at process p, the SPT rooted at p is not constructed during any execution.
Proof. For contradiction, consider the case such that tp < M holds at process p in the initial
con¯guration and the SPT rooted at p is constructed during the execution. The values of depth
variables are changed by S2, S3, S5, and S6. (Note that process p never executes S1 because we
assume Predicateinitp is false in this section.) To construct the SPT rooted at p, the value of dp
remains larger than dq for each q 2 Np until (dp = 0^ tp = 0) holds at p and each q 2 Np should
change the value of dq to (dp ¡ 1).
During the execution, p can execute S2, S3, S5, and S6 to change the value of dp. By the
execution of S5 or S6, dp takes zero. By the execution of S2 or S3, the value of dp is changed to
dr ¡ 1 for a process r 2 Np. So, by the execution of LNS, dp cannot take a larger value than dr0
for any r0 2 Np.
For each q 2 Np, dq cannot take (dp ¡ 1) by executing S2 or S3 because dp is smaller than
M . Clearly, the execution of S5 or S6 cannot make dq to take (dp ¡ 1).
Hence, the SPT rooted at p never constructed during the execution. 2
From Lemma 3, the possible root processes are determined by the initial con¯guration. If
tp =M holds at process p in the initial con¯guration, dq take the value (dp¡ 1) for each q 2 Np
as long as there is no process r such that (dr ¡ dist(r; q)) is larger than (dp ¡ 1). In this case,
the SPT rooted at p is constructed during the execution. If such process r exists, then p may be
involved in the SPT rooted at r even if tp = M holds in the initial con¯guration. In this case,
all the descendants of p in p's SPT is involved in r's SPT.
Lemma 4 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, for non-root process p, if tq = M
holds at some process q 2 Nkp in the initial con¯guration, dp eventually takes the value of
max
q2RNkp fdq ¡ dist(p; q)g.
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Proof. Let p be a non-root process such that RN
k
p 6= ; holds in the initial con¯guration. We
show by induction that dp eventually takes (dq ¡ dist(p; q)) for process q 2 RNkp that maximize
value of (dq ¡ dist(p; q)). Clearly, for each process r on the shortest path(s) from q to p, q
maximize the value of (dq ¡ dist(r; q)).
Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, process r 2 Nq eventually executes S2 or
S3 and dr takes (dq ¡ 1) because q is the nearest root process. Until dr takes (dp ¡ 1) for each
r 2 Nq, q cannot decrement tq (from S4). (If q starts to decrement tq, tq can reach 0 and dq may
take 0 by executing S5 before the SPT is constructed. ) Thus, eventually (dr = dq¡1^ tr =M)
holds at each r 2 Nq.
Let process r0 and r00 be on the shortest path from q to p and dist(q; r00) = dist(q; r0) + 1.
Let (dr0 = dq ¡ dist(q; r0) ^ tr0 = M) eventually hold during the execution. Then, after that,
r00 executes S2 or S3 and tr00 takes dr0 ¡ 1 = dq ¡ dist(q; r0) = dq ¡ dist(q; r00). Until dr00 takes
(dr0 ¡ 1), r0 cannot decrement tr0 (from S4). Thus, eventually (dr00 = dq ¡ dist(q; r00)^ tr00 =M)
holds at r00.
Thus, eventually, dp takes dq ¡ dist(p; q). 2
Then, we focus the execution of S4 at each process to show that all the processes involved in
an SPT can keep on decrementing its timer variable from M to 0. Consider the case such that
p and q 2 Np evaluates the guard of S4 to true in a con¯guration. If p executes S4 ¯rst, the
execution of S4 at p should not prevent the execution of S4 at q, i.e. the evaluation of the guard
of S4 should remain true. When p and q decrements their timer variables at the same time, it
does not matter the countdown.
Lemma 5 The execution of S4 at any process p does not change decq at any q 2 Np from true
to false.
Proof. Let decp = true hold at process p and decq = true hold at process q 2 Np. Thus, decp
and decq, Dp(1), Dp(2), Dq(1), and Dq(2) are evaluated to true. From Dp(1) and Dq(1), we
have tp = tp. From Dp(2) and Dq(2), we have dp = dq.
Consider the case where only p executes S4. After the execution of S4 at p, we have tq = tp¡1.
Because S4 just changes the value of tp, the evaluation of OK tq, Dq(1), and Dq(2) are not
changed by the execution of S4 at p. So, the execution of S4 at process p does not change decq
at any q 2 Np from true to false. 2
Lemma 6 Each process p involved in an SPT rooted at a root process decrements tp from M
to 0 with keeping the s-consistency of timer variables.
Proof. Let p be a process such that RN¡kp 6= ; holds in the initial con¯guration. From Lemma
4, dp eventually takes maxq2RNkp fdp¡dist(p; q)g and p is involved in an SPT correctly. Because
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S4 forces each process to wait until all its neighbors keep the consistent depth value and S4
allows the processes with higher depth values to decrement the timer variable, p cannot execute
S4 until dp keeps the correct value. Thus, (tp =M ^ dp = maxq2RNkp fdp¡ dist(p; q)g eventually
holds at p and all the neighbors. We will show by induction on tp that process p decrements tp
from M to 0 with keeping the s-consistency.
From Lemma 5, the execution of S4 at p does not change decq at each q 2 Np from true to
false. Thus, after p executes S4 and the value of tp changes from M to (M ¡ 1), its neighbors
eventually executes S4, and after that decp = true holds again.
Let tp be (M ¡ `) and decp = true hold at p. From Lemma 5, the execution of S4 at p does
not change decq at each q 2 Np from true to false. Thus, after the execution of S4 at p, its
neighbors eventually executes S4, and after that decp = true holds again.
Consequently, p execute S4 and decrement tp with keeping s-consistency until tp reaches 0.
2
Finally, we show that the system eventually reaches a legitimate con¯guration. Note that
even when :(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ retp = false) holds at process p in the initial con¯guration, it is
possible that there is no root process in Nkp during the stabilization.
Lemma 7 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, the system reaches a con¯guration
where (tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ retp = false) holds at each p 2 V .
Proof. For a con¯guration, let dmax(V ) (tmax(V ), respectively) be the maximum value of dp
(tp, respectively) for all p 2 V . We show that starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration,
dmax(V ) and tmax(V ) eventually reaches 0.
We ¯rst show the outline of the progress of stabilization. The set of root processes are
de¯ned by the initial con¯guration (Lemma 3). All the SPTs rooted at these processes are
eventually constructed by executing S2 and S3 (Lemma 4). Let ¾SPT be the con¯guration such
that after ¾SPT , no process executes S2 and S3. The system eventually reaches ¾SPT because
the execution of LNS does not make new root process(es). For each root process, once the
SPT is constructed, each process p involved in the SPT decrements tp and eventually tp takes
0 by executing S4 (Lemma 5). Let ¾dec be the con¯guration such that after ¾dec, no process
executes S4. The system eventually reaches ¾dec because M is a ¯nite value. After the system
reaches ¾dec, no process executes S6 because no timer variable changes its value, and no depth
variable changes its value to take a larger value. After p and all its neighbors have ¯nished the
countdown, they execute S5. Eventually, all SPTs are removed. Let ¾clr be the con¯guration
such that after ¾clr, no process executes S5. The system eventually reaches ¾clr.
We show the decrement of tmax(V ) and dmax(V ) during the execution. The system ¯rst
reaches ¾SPT , then ¾dec, and ¯nally ¾clr. Until the system reaches ¾SPT , tmax(V ) is smaller
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than or equals to M and after ¾SPT , tmax(V ) decreases monotonically. Let tp at process p takes
tmax(V )(> 0) in a con¯guration after ¾SPT . Because no process executes S2 after SPTs are
constructed, OK dp holds. Also, OK tp holds at p because after ¾SPT , p changes the value of
dp by executing S4 and S6. The execution of S4 preserves OK tp and because tp = tmax(V ), p
has not executed S6. Because tp = tmax(V ), Dp(1) holds at p. And without loss of generality,
we can assume dp ¸ dq when tp = tq = tmax(V ) holds for q 2 Np. So, decp = true holds at p
and p decrements tp by executing S4. After the system reaches ¾dec, tmax(V ) remains 0 because
no process executes S2 thereafter.
Until the system reaches ¾dec, dmax(V ) is smaller than or equals to k and after ¾dec, dmax(V )
decreases monotonically. Let dp takes dmax(V )(> 0) in a con¯guration after ¾dec. Because
(tq = 0) holds each process q 2 V after ¾dec, Cp(1) holds at p. Because dp = dmax(V ), Cp(2)
holds at p. So, clrdp is evaluated to true at p and p decrements dp. After the system reaches
¾clr, dmax(V ) remains zero because no process executes S2 or S3 thereafter.
After the system reaches ¾clr, retp = false holds at each process in one round by the execution
of S7.
Consequently, the system eventually reaches a con¯guration where (tp = 0^ dp = 0^ retp =
false) holds for each process p 2 V . 2
Lemma 8 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, the system reaches a legitimate con-
¯guration in O(k +M) rounds.
Proof. From Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, non-root process p is involved in an SPT or reset tp and
dp. If p is involved in an SPT, it decrements tp from M to 0 and after that p changes dp to 0.
From Lemma 3, root processes are determined by the initial con¯guration. From Lemma
4, the SPTs rooted at root processes are constructed. The SPTs construction takes at most k
rounds because the depth of each SPT is at most k. From Lemma 5, once SPTs are constructed,
the synchronized countdown of tree processes takes place. It takes M rounds for all the tree
processes count down from M to 0.
Each process p executes S5 when all its neighbors has ¯nished decrementing their timer
variables (thus, for each q 2 Np, tp = 0). From clrdp, p can execute S5 after all the neighbors
with higher depth values execute S5. Thus, the execution of S5 starts from the root process
to the leaves of its SPT. It takes at most k rounds for all the tree processes to execute S5 and
(tp = 0 ^ dp = 0) holds at each process p 2 V . It takes at most one round for each process to
chance retp to false (if necessary) by executing S7.
Once (tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ retp = false) holds at each process p 2 V , no process is enabled
and each process p does not change the values of its local variables, tp, dp, and retp. Hence, the
system reaches a legitimate con¯guration and the stabilization time of LNS is O(k +M). 2
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From Lemma 8, the following theorem immediately holds.
Theorem 2 Protocol LNS is self-stabilizing.
3.4.3 Correctness Proof: Synchronization of LNS
In this section, we show that LNS provides the API de¯ned in Speci¯cation 2 and the ¯ve
speci¯cations de¯ned for neighborhood synchronizer in Speci¯cation 3 for M = (r1 + r2) and
k = k1;2.
LNS satis¯es the spatial containment property because only faulty processes can become
root processes, and LNS just involves their k1;2-neighbors into the synchronization (Lemma 9).
From Lemma 8 in Section 3.4.2, the synchronization of LNS takes O(k +M) rounds. From
de¯nition, k +M = (r1 + r2) + maxfc1; c2g+minff1; f2g+ 1 and r1 (r2, respectively) is larger
than f1 and c1 (f2 and c2, respectively). So, O(k +M) equals to O(r1 + r2) and LNS satis¯es
the temporal containment property. The synchronization property holds directly from Lemma 5
in Section 3.4.2. The correct countdown property is satis¯ed because in any execution starting
from a target faulty con¯guration, each correct process ¯rst sets its timer variable (r1 + r2)
(Lemma 10). The initialization property is the special case of Lemma 4 in Section 3.4.2 such
that the timer variable takes (r1 + r2) and the depth variable takes k1;2 at the root process
(Lemma 11).
Lemma 9 Spatial containment
Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, only faulty processes can become root processes
and construct SPTs. Hence, the spatial containment property in Speci¯cation 3 is satis¯ed.
Proof. From Lemma 3, p can become a root process only when tp = M holds in the initial
con¯guration.
At a correct process q, (tq = 0 ^ dq = 0) holds in the initial con¯guration. Thus, starting
from an f -faulty con¯guration, a correct process never become a root process of an SPT. On
the other hand, (dp 6= 0 _ tp 6= 0) holds at a faulty process p. Thus, only faulty processes can
become a root process of an SPT.
From Lemma 4, only the k1;2-neighbors of each root process are involved in the SPT. Thus,
LNS satis¯es the spatial containment property. 2
Lemma 10 Correct countdown
Starting from an faulty con¯guration, if a correct process p changes its state during the recovery,
p ¯rst executes S2 and always countdown from (r1 + r2).
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Proof. In an f -faulty con¯guration, (tp = 0 ^ dp = 0 ^ retp = false) holds at a correct process
p. Thus, initp, maxdp, decp, and clrdp are evaluated to false. The only predicate that can be
evaluated to true at p when (tp = 0^ dp = 0) holds is S2. By executing S2, tp takes (r1+ r2). 2
Lemma 11 Initialization
If process p executes start synch NS, then after that all processes in Nk1;2p [fpg count down their
timer variable from (r1 + r2) to 0.
Proof. The execution of start synch NS at process p changes Predicateinitp from false to true.
When Predicateinitp is true, p can execute only S1 and S7. Thus, S1 becomes a root process
and after that, the SPT rooted at p is constructed (Lemma 4). From Lemma 6, each process in
N
k1;2
p decrements its timer variable from (r1 + r2) to 0.
During the recovery, there may be multiple SPTs rooted at di®erent root processes. However,
the distance from any root process to any other root process is at most minff1; f2g. Thus, the
SPTs encounter each other during the SPT construction phase. So, a process involved in SPTs
waits its depth variable to take correct value for its nearest root process and after that it starts
to decrement its timer variable from M to 0.
Note that if faulty process p is surrounded by other faulty processes, then p may become
a root process even if dp is smaller than k. In this case, just among faulty processes, there
may be an SPT such that the depth of the SPT is smaller than k. However, correct processes
always attend an SPT of depth k because the nearest root process for a correct process executes
start synch NS. 2
Consequently, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Starting from an f -faulty con¯guration, LNS satis¯es Speci¯cation 3 for k = k1;2
and M = (r1 + r2).
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we ¯rst introduced the RWFC strategy for fault-containing composition. Our
strategy is to stop the execution of the upper protocol until the lower protocol recovers. We
can compose more than two fault-containing protocols with RWFC strategy by applying RWFC
strategy repeatedly to the source protocols. Though the strategy is very simple, it provides
signi¯cant improvement on composing fault-containing protocols. Furthermore, this framework
helps designing new fault-containing protocols, e.g. we can easily built new fault-containing
protocols on top of existing fault-containing protocols.
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In this chapter, we proposed a fault-containing composition RWFC-LNS that utilizes the
temporal containment property of fault-containing protocols. The proposed composition tech-
nique RWFC-LNS stops the upper protocol during the recovery time of the lower protocol and
utilizes timers at processes to measure the recovery time of the source protocols. To implement
timers, we designed a local neighborhood synchronizer protocol LNS.
In RWFC-LNS, when some process ¯nds inconsistency in the lower protocol, each process
in the contamination radius stops the upper protocol during the recovery time of the lower
protocol. Though LNS imposes additional communication overhead and time complexity, the
overall overhead is bounded by the contamination radius of source protocols. The contamination
of the composite protocol is also bounded by the contamination radius of source protocols.
Hence, the proposed composition technique preserves the fault-containment property of source
protocols. Unfortunately, because the proposed framework stops the upper protocol for the
recovery time of the lower protocol, even when the lower protocol has recovered earlier than its
recovery time, the upper protocol does not resume immediately.
The notion of local neighborhood synchronizer and the implementation LNS are useful in
fault-containment and other fault-tolerant distributed protocols. For example, we can improve
the spatial containment property of [23] by replacing the global neighborhood synchronizer with
our local neighborhood synchronizer. Other applications of the local neighborhood synchronizer
remain to be discussed and developed.
Chapter 4
Hierarchical Composition with
Spatial Containment
Fault-containing protocols provide temporal containment and/or spatial containment. In Chap-
ter 3, we proposed fault-containing composition RWFC-LNS based on temporal containment
property of source protocols. In this chapter, we present a fault-containing composition tech-
nique based on the spatial containment property of source protocols. The proposed composition
technique also improves the recovery scenario of RWFC-LNS. In the worst case, RWFC-LNS
keeps the upper protocol waiting after the lower protocol has recovered. This is because the
recovery time of a fault-containing protocol is the maximum (worst) time necessary for the re-
covery. In this chapter, we improve the recovery scenario by executing the upper protocol as
soon as the lower protocol recovers.
The proposed composition technique checks the inconsistency of the lower protocol to detect
the recovery of the lower protocol. Generally, in self-stabilizing protocols, each process checks
the inconsistency between its neighbors with local predicates. In fault-containing protocols,
each process utilizes this local consistency predicate to ¯nd faulty processes and if it ¯nds a
faulty process, then the process waits for the recovery actions of the faulty process so that
the e®ect of the fault is contained around the faulty process. In this chapter, we utilize this
local consistency predicate to detect the recovery of the lower protocol. We call the proposed
composition technique RWFC-IcD (RWFC with the Inconsistency Detector). The inconsistency
range of a fault-containing protocol guarantees that from a target faulty con¯guration, there
always exists at least one process that ¯nds inconsistency in the inconsistency range from a
faulty process. We force each process to check the consistency of the lower protocol among
the inconsistency range. When the process ¯nds no inconsistency in the lower protocol, it is
guaranteed that the process can execute the upper protocol on a correct input from the lower
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protocol. Then, the composition protocol allows the process to execute the upper protocol.
Thus, the upper protocol can recover with its fault-containment property and the composite
protocol promises fault-containment as a whole.
To implement RWFC-IcD, it is necessary to implement the inconsistency detector that allows
each process to detect the inconsistency of the lower protocol. We implement the inconsistency
detector IcD based on an existing Propagation of Information with Feedback (PIF) protocol PIF
in [12], however, PIF itself is not fault-containing. Hence, we modi¯ed PIF to provide spatial
and temporal containment property.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we show conditions on source protocols.
In Section 4.2, we ¯rst de¯ne the speci¯cation of the inconsistency detector and then present
the composition framework RWFC-IcD. The correctness proof of RWFC-IcD is also shown in
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we present an implementation of the inconsistency detector, protocol
IcD and prove that IcD satis¯es the speci¯cation in Section 4.2. We conclude this chapter with
Section 4.4.
4.1 Preliminary
In this chapter, we consider self-stabilization and fault-containment of protocols for non-reactive
problems. We follow De¯nition 5 (fault-containing composition), Remark 1 and Assumption 1
in Section 3.1. We also follow De¯nition 6 (RWFC strategy) and Remark 2 in Section 3.1.
In this chapter, we put some assumptions on the source protocols of fault-containing compo-
sitions. We consider a subclass of fault-containing protocols ¦ such that each f -fault-containing
protocol P 2 ¦ satis¯es Assumption 1, 2, 5, and 6. (Note that Assumption 1 (unique legiti-
mate con¯guration), and Assumption 2 (legitimacy predicate) are de¯ned in Chapter 3.) Many
existing fault-containing protocols satisfy Assumption 1, 2, 5, and 6 [33, 24, 25, 22].
Assumption 5 In an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f), if faulty process p is a neighbor of correct
process(es), at least one correct process q 2 Np or p itself evaluates consq(P ) (or consp(P )) false.
Many fault-containing protocols satis¯es Assumption 5: for a faulty process p and a neighboring
correct process q, the predicate consp(P ) (consq(P ), respectively) involves the local variables at
q (p, respectively). Because p is faulty, there can be some inconsistency between the local state
of p and that of q.
Note that if p and all its neighbors are faulty, consp(P ) = true may hold at p. This is because
consp(P ) involves the local variables at p and its neighbors and the values of these corrupted
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variables happen to seem consistent. In this case, p cannot determine whether it is faulty or
not.
The inconsistency range of P is the maximum (worst) distance from any faulty process to
the process q that evaluates consq(P ) false because of the faulty process during the recovery
from an f 0-faulty con¯guration (f 0 · f).
Assumption 6 Let k be the inconsistency range of P . Starting from any f 0-faulty con¯guration
(f 0 · f), for each faulty process p, in every con¯guration there exists at least one process
q 2 Nkp [ fpg such that consq(P ) is evaluated false until the local variables at p takes the values
that they take in the legitimate con¯guration.
The upper bound of the inconsistency range of a protocol is obtained by its contamination
number or recovery time that are always larger than or equals to the inconsistency range. We
can obtain the more accurate value of the inconsistency range by analyzing the behavior of the
protocol. In many 1-fault-containing protocols [33, 24, 25, 22], inconsistency range is 1: in theses
protocols, in a 1-faulty con¯guration the faulty process or its neighbors may suspect it is faulty
and exchange the local information with neighbors. If a correct process ¯nds the faulty process,
the process waits until the faulty process changes its variables.
4.2 Composition Framework
Let P1 be an f1-fault-containing protocol and P2 be an f2-fault-containing protocol. Our goal
is to produce f1;2-fault-containing protocol (P1 ¤ P2) for f1;2 = minff1; f2g. In this chapter, we
use the notations shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Notations for the source protocols and the composite protocol (RWFC-IcD)
protocol number of maximum faults recovery time contamination number inconsistency range
P1 f1 t1 c1 k1
P2 f2 t2 c2 k2
(P1 ¤ P2) f1;2 = minff1; f2g t1;2 c1;2 k1;2
A corruption at process p in P1 can change the evaluation of guards of P1 and P2 only at
p and its neighbors. This is because the guards of each process involve the local variables at
the process itself and its neighbors. So, it is possible that conss(P2) is evaluated false at some
process s 2 Np. If s executes P2, the e®ect of the corruption at p spreads in P2. To prevent this,
it is necessary that each process in Np does not execute P2 until the variables at p takes the
values that they take in the legitimate con¯guration. By forcing all processes in Np to stop the
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Figure 4.1: Inconsistency range around a faulty process
execution of P2 during the recovery of P1, we can prevent the e®ect of the fault from spreading
in P2. From Assumption 6, there exists at least one process r in Nk1p for p and in N
k1+1
s for s
such that consr(P1) is evaluated false during the recovery (See Figure 4.1). RWFC strategy is
a strategy for fault-containing composition: P2 should wait the recovery of P1. To implement
RWFC strategy, the proposed fault-containing composition stops P2 by using the contamination
radius k1 of P1.
We can allow faulty processes to execute P2 before P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration
because in an f -faulty con¯guration, even if faulty processes executes P2 before P1 recovers, the
number of faulty processes in P2 is still no larger than f (· f1;2). What is important is that no
correct process executes P2 before P1 recovers. If some correct process executes P2 before the
recovery of P1, the number of faulty processes in P2 may exceed f2.
The idea of our composition is to make each process p check the inconsistency of each
q 2 Nk1+1p . For simplicity, we ¯rst assume that each process can evaluate consq(P1) for each
q 2 Nk1+1p with the inconsistency detector. The inconsistency detector guarantees that starting
from any f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), it provides
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) to p in O(jN
k1+1
p j)
rounds. We just de¯ne the speci¯cation and the interface of the inconsistency detector in
Section 4.2.1, because our focus is not on the implementation of the inconsistency detector but
on the fault-containing composition. We show an implementation of the inconsistency detector
in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Speci¯cation of the Inconsistency Detector
The inconsistency detector provides the evaluation of
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) to each process p 2 V .
Each process p has two variables, reqp and resp: when p requests the inconsistency detector to
evaluate
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1), p sets reqp = 1, otherwise 0. The inconsistency detector stores
the result in resp that takes a value in ftrue; false;?g and p receives the result by reading resp.
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(Note that p cannot change the value of resp.)
Speci¯cation 4 The Inconsistency Detector
(i) In a legitimate con¯guration, reqp = 0 ^ resp = ? holds at each process p 2 V .
(ii) If process p 2 V changes reqp from 0 to 1 when resp = ?, resp takes true or false in ®
rounds with changing the state of only the processes in N¯p :
² if V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) = false holds when the inconsistency detector changes resp
from ?, resp takes false.
² if V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) = true holds when the inconsistency detector changes resp from
?, resp takes true or false. Even when resp = false holds, the inconsistency detector
returns resp = true in a constant number of requests.
(iii) ® and ¯ are bounded by some polynomial in k1.
(iv) When reqp = 0^resp 6= ? holds at process p 2 V , the inconsistency detector sets resp = ?
in O(1) rounds.
After p requests the evaluation to the inconsistency detector, if reqp = 1^ resp = true holds,
process p can determine that consq(P1) = true holds at each q 2 Nk1+1p .
4.2.2 Composition Protocol RWFC-IcD
The composition protocol RWFC-IcD checks the consistency of P1 by using the inconsistency
detector whenever the upper protocol needs to be executed.
Protocol 4:2:1 shows RWFC-IcD for (P1 ¤P2) at process p that provides f1;2-fault-containing
protocol. For each i 2 f1; 2g, G(Pi) is the disjunction of all guards of protocol Pi at p, and
A(Pi) indicates the corresponding action of one of the enabled guards of G(Pi).
Protocol 4.2.1 RWFC-IcD for (P1 ¤ P2)
Actions for process p
S1 G(P1) ¡! A(P1)
S2 G(P2) ^ reqp = 0 ^ resp = ? ¡! reqp = 1
S3 G(P2) ^ reqp = 1 ^ resp = false ¡! reqp = 0
S4 G(P2) ^ reqp = 1 ^ resp = true ¡! A(P2); reqp = 0
Starting from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), process p can execute P1 whenever it
has an enabled guard of P1 by executing S1. However, when p has an enabled guard of P2,
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p should check the inconsistency of P1 among Nk1+1p . Process p requests the evaluation to
the inconsistency detector by executing S2 and checks the result with S3 and S4. If there is no
process q 2 Nk1+1p that ¯nds inconsistency in P1, then p executes P2 by executing S4. Otherwise,
p waits the recovery of P1 by executing S3.
4.2.3 Correctness Proof of RWFC-IcD
First, we show the stabilization of RWFC-IcD. Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration,
each process can execute P1 whenever it has an enabled guard of P1. Thus, it is obvious
that eventually P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration and the output of P1 (the input to P2)
eventually becomes unchanged. After that, if process p requests the inconsistency detector to
evaluate
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1), p always receives resp = true. Thus, the execution of (P1 ¤ P2) is
that of P2. So, it is obvious that (P1 ¤ P2) eventually reaches the legitimate con¯guration. The
following lemma holds clearly.
Lemma 12 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, RWFC-IcD for (P1 ¤P2) eventually
reaches the legitimate con¯guration.
Secondly, we show the fault-containment of RWFC-IcD. Starting from an f -faulty con¯gura-
tion (f · f1;2), P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration in its recovery time and with its contam-
ination number (Lemma 13). Until P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration, each correct process
that is a neighbor of a faulty process cannot execute P2 (Lemma 13). However, a faulty process
may execute P2 before P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration, e.g. if reqp = 1 ^ resp = true
holds at a faulty process p in an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), then p can execute P2. Though
p executes P2 before P1 recovers, the number of faulty processes in the resulting con¯guration
of P2 is still no larger than f2. Thus, after P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration, P2 can reach
the legitimate con¯guration with its fault-containment property.
The composite protocol (P1¤P2) via RWFC-IcD preserves the fault-containment property of
the source protocols (Theorem 4). The performance of the obtained protocol depends on those
of P1, P2, and the inconsistency detector.
Starting from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), P1 ¯rst reaches the legitimate con¯gura-
tion with its fault-containment property.
Lemma 13 Starting from any f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), P1 reaches the legitimate con-
¯guration with its recovery time and contamination number. During the recovery of P1, each
correct process that is a neighbor of a faulty process cannot execute P2.
Proof. Starting from an f -faulty con¯guration (f · f1;2), P1 reaches the legitimate con¯gura-
tion with its recovery time and contamination number because S1 is P1 itself.
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In an f -faulty con¯guration, reqq = 0^resq = ? holds at each correct process q. If a correct
process q is a neighbor of a faulty process and q has an enabled guard in P2, q changes reqq from 0
to 1 by executing S2 and the inconsistency detector returns the evaluation of
V
r2Nk1+1q consr(P1).
From Assumption 6, if P1 is not in the legitimate con¯guration, q receives resq = false. So,
correct processes neighboring some faulty process(es) do not execute P2 with incorrect output
from P1. 2
Lemma 14 After P1 reaches the legitimate con¯guration, P2 reaches the legitimate con¯guration
with the recovery time of t2® and the contamination number of c2¢¯, where ¢ is the maximum
degree in G.
Proof. From Lemma 13, there exist at most f (· f1;2) faulty processes in P2 when P1
reaches the legitimate con¯guration. Thus, P2 reaches the legitimate con¯guration with its
fault-containment property: for the variables of P2, the recovery time and the contamination
number is still t2 and c2.
However, each process p should check the consistency of P1 with the inconsistency detector
whenever p has an enabled guard of P2. From Speci¯cation 4, this forces each q 2 N¯p to change
their states and imposes ® rounds for p to obtain the result. Thus, in RWFC-IcD, it takes t2®
rounds for P2 to reach the legitimate con¯guration with the number of c2¢¯ processes changing
their local states. 2
From Speci¯cation 4, ® and ¯ are bounded by some polynomial in k1.
Theorem 4 RWFC-IcD provides an minff1; f2g-fault-containing protocol (P1¤P2) for f1-fault-
containing protocol P1 and f2-fault-containing protocol P2. The recovery time is (t1 + t2®) and
the contamination number is maxfc1; c2¢¯g.
Proof. From Lemma 13 and 14, RWFC-IcD executes P1 and P2 in the coordinated order and
each protocol executes its own recovery actions. So the maximum number of faults that the
obtained protocol guarantees fault-containment is f1;2 = minff1; f2g. From Lemma 14, the
recovery time is (t1 + t2®) and the contamination number is maxfc1; c2¢¯g. 2
4.3 Inconsistency Detector
In this section, we show an implementation of the inconsistency detector.
The inconsistency detector should provide the communication between process p and each
q 2 Nk1+1p to evaluate
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) whenever p changes reqp from 0 to 1. In the locally
shared memory model, process p can read only the local variables at its direct neighbors. Thus,
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it is necessary to broadcast the request to each process q 2 Nk1+1p and each q 2 Nk1+1p should
return the evaluation of consq(P1) to p.
Recall that the legitimate predicate L(P1) ´ 8p 2 V : consp(P1) is a stable predicate on
con¯gurations in P1. Thus, starting from a target faulty con¯guration, once L(P1) = true holds,
L(P1) remains true thereafter. However, the fault-containment property guarantees that only
the processes in the inconsistency range of each faulty process p change their states during the
recovery. So, starting from a target faulty con¯guration, once consq(P1) holds for each q 2 Nk1+1p
for a faulty process p, consq(P1) remains true at all q 2 Nk1+1p thereafter. Consequently, the
inconsistency detector should answer whether there is a con¯guration where
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1)
holds between the time when p requests by changing reqp from 0 to 1 and the time the incon-
sistency detector answers to p by changing resp from ? to a value in ftrue; falseg.
One simple solution for evaluating a stable predicate is to use PIF (Propagation of Infor-
mation with Feedback) protocols that take a snapshot of global con¯gurations by broadcasting
a request to all processes and gathering feedbacks from all processes.
However, we do not need any global detection but the local detection among Nk1+1p for
process p. One way to involve Nk1+1p into some task is to use the breadth ¯rst tree of height
(k1 + 1) rooted at p. Whenever process p changes reqp to 1, p constructs the breadth ¯rst tree
and by using a PIF protocol on the breadth ¯rst tree, p broadcasts the request to each q 2 Nk1+1p
and q feedbacks the evaluation of consq(P1) to p. We can use the breadth ¯rst tree construction
protocol in [30] by setting the height of the tree k1 + 1.
However, this simple implementation cannot provide the correct evaluation of the predicateV
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1) to p. Because each process executes P1 during the request and feedback of
a PIF protocol, the evaluation of consq(P1) at q 2 Nk1+1p may change during the feedback: e.g.
after q sends consq(P1) = true as a feedback, if the evaluation of consq(P1) changes from true
to false (it may be caused by some state change of the processes in Nq), p cannot obtain the
correct evaluation of
V
q2Nk1+1p consq(P1).
Generally, to evaluate a stable predicate among processes, PIF is used twice. The ¯rst PIF
propagates the request to each process and each process starts to observe the stable predicate.
The second PIF gathers the result of observation at each process via the feedback of PIF. In
this way, one can evaluate a stable predicate on con¯gurations.
Cournier et al. proposed a snap-stabilizing PIF protocol for arbitrary networks [12]. Their
protocol PIF guarantees that each process returns the feedback after all processes in V received
the request. Thus, by using PIF, we can collect the observation of the stable predicate with a
single PIF execution.
We allow each process p to execute PIF independently in parallel so that each process
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q 2 Nk1+1p can evaluate
V
r2Nk1+1q consr(P1) when q changes reqq from 0 to 1. This is done,
for example, by attaching the ID of q to the broadcast and feedback. This imposes additional
memory of size of O(jNk1+1p j log n) at p to manage di®erent trees while this does not impose
additional time complexity.
We modify PIF as follows:
(i) process p constructs the breadth ¯rst tree of height (k1 + 1) rooted at p when it changes
reqp from 0 to 1.
(ii) process q starts to observe consq(P1) when it receives the request of the PIF protocol. If
consp(P1) = true holds during the observation, p records it.
(iii) q returns the result of the observation to p with the feedback of PIF.
The snap-stabilization property of PIF guarantees that starting from an arbitrary initial
con¯guration, whenever the root process begins the broadcast, every process receives the broad-
cast and the root process receives feedback from every process in O(N) rounds. Thus, in our
implementation, the broadcast and feedback take O(Nk1+1p ) rounds. The breadth-¯rst tree is
constructed in O(k1 + 1) rounds. Thus, p receives the feedback from all processes in Nk1+1p
in O(jNk1+1p j) rounds. Consequently, the value of ® in Speci¯cation 4 is a polynomial in k1.
Because only the processes in Nk1+1p change their states, the value of ¯ in Speci¯cation 4 is
k1 + 1. So, the condition (iii) of Speci¯cation 4 is satis¯ed.
To satisfy the condition (iv) of Speci¯cation 4, the inconsistency detector should check reqp
and resp, and whenever reqp = 0 ^ resp 6= ? holds at p, it should change resp to ?.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed a fault-containing composition technique that utilizes spatial con-
tainment property of source protocols. Because fault-containing protocols provide the temporal
containment property and/or the spatial containment property, RWFC-IcD is the complement
of RWFC-LNS.
We utilize the spatial containment property of fault-containing protocols to check the incon-
sistency of the lower protocol. Then, we de¯ned and implemented the inconsistency detector
that enables each process to communicate with the processes in its inconsistency range of the
lower protocol. Our implementation is based on an existing snap-stabilizing PIF protocol and
we modi¯ed PIF [12] so that it is executed among the processes in the inconsistency range of
the lower protocol. The performance of obtained protocol depends on the inconsistency detec-
tor. Though the PIF protocol imposes additional communication overhead and execution time,
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the e®ect is contained around faulty processes in the inconsistency range of the lower protocol.
The inconsistency range of the lower protocol is limited because the lower protocol is fault-
containing. Thus, the overhead imposed by the PIF protocol is small and do not spread over
the entire network.
To accelerate the composite protocol by RWFC, we can use the legitimacy of only output
variables of the lower protocol (called output legitimacy) instead of legitimacy of input, inner,
and output variables. This is because the upper protocol just uses the output variables of the
lower protocol as its input. However, to adopt output legitimacy, it is necessary that when the
system starts from a target faulty con¯guration, once the lower protocol reaches the output
legitimate con¯guration, it does not change the values of output variables thereafter. Note that
not all the fault-containing protocols provide this property for output legitimacy.
Chapter 5
Ring Embedding Preserving
Fault-containment Property
In this chapter, we present a ring embedding on an arbitrary rooted tree that enables simulation
of fault-containing ring protocols on an arbitrary rooted tree.
The most desirable ring embedding is the one along a Hamiltonian cycle of the tree network,
but ¯nding a Hamiltonian cycle is computationally intractable. To embed a ring on an arbitrary
network, one way is to embed the ring in a spanning tree of the network. Commonly used ring
embeddings on a tree are the Euler tour [14] (Figure 5.1(a)), the one proposed by Sekanina
[37, 49] (Figure 5.1(b)), and an embedding similar to Sekanina's, proposed by Arora et al. [2].
We observe that adjacent processes in the tree remain adjacent in the Euler tour, but not in
Sekanina's or Arora's ring embeddings; Sekanina's and Arora's embeddings have the dilation
(the maximum distance in the tree between consecutive processes in the ring) of three. Also,
each process in the tree corresponds to a single process in the ring in Sekanina's and Arora's
embeddings, while in the Euler tour a process in the tree is duplicated a number of times equal
to its degree. Thus for a tree with n processes, the length of the ring based on the Euler tour is
2n¡ 2, respectively n for Sekanina's and Arora's ring embeddings.
Simulation of protocols designed for simple networks (e.g. rings) on an arbitrary network
facilitates the design of new protocols. However, it involves the di±culty described below when
applied to fault-containing protocols. Euler tour embedding cannot preserve the fault contain-
ment property of ring protocols. This impossibility is due to the fact that a tree process appears
in the Euler ring several times: a faulty process in the tree is treated as multiple faults in the
ring. The number of faults in the ring may exceed the maximum number of faults that the
fault-containing ring protocol can tolerate. Sekanina's embedding is the ¯rst step in preserving
fault-containment of a ring protocol in a tree. The one-to-one node embedding ensures that a
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(a) Euler tour ring (b) Sekanina's ring
Figure 5.1: Ring embedding on a tree
fault that a®ects a single process in the tree can be treated as a single faulty process in the ring.
However this embedding alone cannot ensure fault-containment completely since the links of the
ring go through some intermediate process(es) that can be corrupted by a fault, thus corrupting
the ring communication.
The proposed simulation protocol RET (ring embedding protocol on an arbitrary tree)
enables fault-containing protocols to be executed on Sekanina's ring embedded on an arbitrary
rooted tree. The dilation of Sekanina's embedding is three, thus neighboring processes in the
virtual ring are not necessarily neighboring processes in the tree. Additionally, any process p,
of degree ±p, is an intermediate process for ±p ¡ 1 embedded ring links. Thus a single fault
at process p can a®ect communication for ±p virtual links of Sekanina's embedding that pass
through p.
To overcome this di±culty, we force eahc sender process to send each data ¯ve timers and
the destination process to compute majority of the received data to exclude the corrupted data.
We use a communication synchronizer [45] among neighboring processes so that for each data
to be routed at most two corrupted pieces of the data are read at the endpoint process, and
We force each piece of data to be relayed ¯ve times and the endpoint process to apply the
majority computation on them. Because there are at most two corrupted pieces of data in each
set of ¯ve pieces of data, the corrupted data is removed at the endpoint process. Repeating
the communication ¯ve times before delivering the data causes a slowdown in executing the
ring protocol in the tree, but overall the slowdown of the ring protocol is proportional to the
maximum degree of the tree.
Related works. We introduce the notion of causal simulation, a method for applying ring
protocols to trees that preserves the fault-containment property. Lynch de¯ned the simulation
relation between two di®erent protocols that requires one protocol traces every global con¯gu-
ration of the other protocol [41]. However, our simulation protocol cannot provide simulation
relation between the execution of the original fault-containing ring protocol and the execution of
the simulation protocol. This is because each virtual link have di®erent communication delays.
Causal simulation preserves the read/write causality of each data of the execution of original
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protocol and this is strong enough to guarantee that the simulating protocol executes the same
task as the original protocol. This is because most of reactive and non-reactive tasks are based
on read/write causality.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we present system models and the
de¯nition of the vertex bijective ring. In Section 5.2 we de¯ne the causal simulation. In Section
5.3 we present protocol RET that provides a causal simulation of ring protocols by simulating the
communication link on the vertex bijective ring. In Section 5.4 we show how protocol RET can
be used to design a 1-fault-containing leader election protocol in arbitrary trees. We conclude
this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.1 Preliminary
In this chapter, we consider self-stabilizing protocols and fault-containing protocols for reactive
and non-reactive problems. Hence, the set of legitimate con¯gurations of a problem is de¯ned
by De¯nition 2.
In this chapter, when a process is corrupted by a fault we consider that the process has
executed a faulty action and the process is called faulty.
We embed a vertex bijective ring on a rooted tree and simulate a fault-containing ring
protocol on the embedded ring.
De¯nition 7 Vertex Bijective Ring
Given a tree T = (V;E), a vertex bijective ring of T is any ring R = (V;E0) embedded on T
such that each process of tree T appears only once on the ring R.
The processes and the links of a vertex bijective ring R are called virtual, and the processes
and the links of T are called real. The dilation of R in T is the maximum distance in T between
any neighboring processes in R.
Sekanina's ring embedding [49] is an example of a vertex bijective ring of a tree with dilation
of three. It can be described as a preorder-postorder traversal of the tree. Given a tree T = (V;E)
rooted at process r, the processes in T are divided into even and odd-level processes such that:
(i) the root is at even level, and (ii) a process is at odd (even) level i® its parent is at even (odd)
level. The preorder-postorder traversal starts with the root process r, then continues along a
depth-¯rst traversal. A process p 2 V is deployed on the virtual ring as follows. If p's level
is even, p is deployed as preorder traversal, that is, p is deployed on the ring before all its
descendants in the tree. If p's level is odd, p is deployed as postorder traversal, that is, p is
deployed on the ring after all its descendants.
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(a) preorder-postorder traversal (b) The Virtual Ring
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(c) Routing in the Virtual Ring
Figure 5.2: Preorder-postorder traversal
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Two adjacent processes in a preorder-postorder traversal are connected by a virtual link. To
form a ring, a virtual link is added between the last visited process and the root process r. The
preorder-postorder traversal for a given tree topology is shown in Figure 5.2(a). The obtained
ring is shown in Figure 5.2(b). Process a (the root of the tree T ) is deployed ¯rst. The successor
of a in the traversal is e because b's level is odd and the next preorder process is e. Process e,
whose level is even, is deployed for the ring before e's descendants (processes i, j, and k) are
deployed. Process b, whose level is odd, is selected for the ring after its descendants (processes
e, i, j, k, and f) are deployed.
Figure 5.2(c) shows the virtual links of the embedded ring presented in Figure 5.2(b). Each
virtual link is a path of at most three real (tree) links (e.g., a virtual link (b; g) is a path (b; a; c; g)
in the tree).
5.2 Causal Simulation
In this section we give a formal de¯nition of causal simulation. We ¯rst introduce the causal
simulation of a fault-free and non-stabilizing case, then we progress into a self-stabilizing case
and a fault-containing case. The idea of causal simulation of protocol Pv designed for topology
Tv is that a protocol Pr designed for topology Tr executes the same task as Pv.
We now de¯ne what it means that one protocol Pr de¯ned for topology Tr provides a causal
simulation of another protocol Pv de¯ned for topology Tv, both using locally shared memory
model. Besides the variables of Pv, a process in Pr may have another set of variables. The
variables that are common to Pv and Pr are called common and the rest are called non-common.
Thus the projection of a process state in Pr on to its common variables represents its state in Pv.
Given an execution Er of Pr, this projection de¯nes the behavior in Pv. R(Er) represents the
execution in Pv obtained by the projection of Er and removing some stuttering con¯gurations
in it. Causal simulation guarantees that any execution Er of Pr has a corresponding execution
Ev of Pv such that we can obtain R(Er) by a shift operation on time-space diagram of Ev. We
call this shift operation as causal shift since the operation preserves the read/write causality of
the original execution in a sense that any data read was written before.
Generally, when executing a self-stabilizing protocol or a fault-containing protocol, a process
may write the same value on one register repeatedly. For example, let a process write value a
to one register three times. We consider this as write actions of three di®erent data: e.g. a(1),
a(2), a(3) are written in the register successively. Causal shift should preserve the read/write
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(a) Time-space diagram of Pv (b) State shift (i) of (a) (c) State addition (ii) of (a)
Figure 5.3: An example of causal shift
causality for each a(1), a(2), a(3).
De¯nition 8 Causal Shift
Given an in¯nite execution Ev of Pv, a causal shift modi¯es the time-space diagram of Ev as
follows:
(i) shift states on the temporal lines of processes, but keep each write event of some data precedent
to any read event of that data, and
(ii) add some copies of the initial state of a process as the ¯rst states of the process so that the
initial states of all processes are aligned.
The time-space diagram obtained from execution Ev by causal shift represents a sequence
of con¯gurations denoted by Evjcs. Evjcs is not uniquely de¯ned by Ev.
Figure 5.3 shows an example of a causal shift where we focus on the read/write causality of
data a that is written to the register at process p and after that is read by one of p's neighbors,
q. Process q changes its state from c to d according to data a (Figure 5.3(a)). Because causal
shift should preserve that the data read should always be written before, we can shift the states
at q to right. Let the operation (i) of causal shift shift the temporal line of q as Figure 5.3(b).
Then, the ¯rst state c of q is copied and the initial states of p and q are aligned. The sequence
of con¯guration obtained from Pv is given in Figure 5.3(c). Causal shift does not violate the
read/write causality of the original execution.
We say two states sp of process p and sq of process q (p 6= q) are concurrent in an execution
i® sp and sq have no relation in the sense of read/write causality. From De¯nition 8 the following
remark follows immediately.
Remark 3 For any con¯guration ¾ in Evjcs, all local states that are part of ¾ are concurrent
states in Ev.
Any con¯guration sequence obtained by a causal shift from an execution denotes another exe-
cution in an asynchronous message passing system. However, in locally shared memory model,
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Evjcs does not necessarily denote an execution. For example, in Figure 5.3(c) process q cannot
read a when the state of p is b. Causal simulation is weaker than the simulation relation de¯ned
by Lynch [41]. Lynch de¯ned a simulation relation between two protocols such that for any
execution of one protocol, every computation step is traced by the other protocol. This means
every global con¯guration of the original protocol appears in the simulation protocol. Causal
simulation does not trace global con¯gurations of original executions but preserves the local
behavior of each process and the read/write causality. This is su±cient for many problems such
that the legitimacy of the problem is de¯ned by the read/write causality: e.g. leader election
problem, spanning tree construction problem, token circulation problem, and so on.
De¯nition 9 Causal Simulation of Fault-free Non-stabilizing Protocols
A protocol Pr de¯ned for a topology Tr provides a causal simulation of another protocol Pv
de¯ned for a topology Tv (with the same process set as Tr) on a locally shared memory model
i® for any in¯nite execution Er of Pr, there exists an in¯nite execution Ev of Pv such that we
obtain R(Er) from Evjcs.
Starting from a prede¯ned good initial con¯guration, it may be possible to provide a causal
simulation of the original protocol from the initial con¯guration. However, self-stabilizing proto-
cols start from an arbitrary initial con¯guration. We relax the restriction for a causal simulation
of self-stabilizing protocols: starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, Pr eventually pro-
vides the causal simulation of Pv. Thus, to preserve the self-stabilization of Pv, causal simulation
guarantees that any execution of Pr starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration has a suf-
¯x whose projection on to the common variables is obtained from some causal shift of some
execution of Pv. We denote an in¯nite su±x of an in¯nite execution E by su®(E).
De¯nition 10 Causal Simulation of Fault-free Self-stabilizing Protocols
A protocol Pr de¯ned for a topology Tr provides a causal simulation of another self-stabilizing
protocol Pv de¯ned for a topology Tv (with the same process set as Tr) on a locally shared memory
model i® for any in¯nite execution Er of Pr starting from any arbitrary initial con¯guration,
there exists an in¯nite execution Ev of Pv such that we obtain su®(R(Er)) from Evjcs.
A con¯guration ¾r of Pr is cs-legitimate i® for any execution starting from ¾r the projection
of it is obtained by a causal shift of some execution of Pv starting from a legitimate con¯guration
of Pv. Since Pr do the same task as Pv and Pv is a self-stabilizing protocol, Pr eventually reaches
a cs-legitimate con¯guration.
Remark 4 Starting from any arbitrary initial con¯guration, Pr eventually reaches a cs-legiti-
mate con¯guration.
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Figure 5.4: Faults in Pr
To preserve the fault containment of Pv, intuitively the following conditions should be satis¯ed:
if Er starts with a cs-legitimate con¯guration ¾r of Pr and the fault corrupts some processes in
the ¯rst computation step, R(Er) should be a su±x of a causal shift of some execution Ev of Pv
such that all the faulty processes experience faulty actions in Ev in a legitimate con¯guration
¾v at the same time in Ev and the faulty actions change all the common variables in the same
way as Er. If the number of faulty processes is not larger than the maximum number for which
Ev guarantees fault containment, Er shows the fault-containing recovery because Er provides a
causal simulation of Ev.
However, it is not guaranteed that the above condition holds. This is because Er is obtained
by a causal shift of some execution Ev of Pv. A causal shift shifts states on the temporal line of
processes of Ev and may also shift the faulty actions in Ev executed at the same time at di®erent
processes. Furthermore, a causal shift can produce a con¯guration of Er that may never appear
in Ev. For example, based on the causal shift, such execution of Pr can exist (Figure 5.4). After
the fault corrupts some process p, a non-faulty process q reads the data that p holds before
the corruption. Thus, the projection of global con¯guration just before the corruption cannot
appear in Pv.
Still, it is guaranteed that there is some execution Ev of Pv such that all faulty processes
execute faulty actions in a legitimate con¯guration of Pv and the projection of the states before
and after the corruption at faulty processes is same as those in Ev.
Remark 5 There exists an execution of Pv such that all faulty processes execute faulty actions
in a legitimate con¯guration of Pv and those faulty actions change all the common variables in
the same way as Er.
Proof. Consider the case that faults corrupted two processes in a cs-legitimate con¯guration
¾r of Pr. These two faults occur at processes p and q, and p (respectively, q) changes its state
from sp to s0p (from sq to s0q, respectively). Let R(sp) represent the projection of sp on to the
common variables.
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Since ¾r is a cs-legitimate con¯guration of Pr, the projection of ¾r is obtained by causal shift
of some execution of Pr starting from a legitimate con¯guration.
Let us consider fault-free executions ¯rst. From some fault-free execution, E¤r = ¾r; ¾r+1; : : :,
Er is obtained by corrupting some processes after ¾r. Such E¤r is obtained from some execution
of Pv starting from a legitimate con¯guration since ¾r is a cs-legitimate con¯guration. Let ¦(¾r)
be a set of executions of Pv from which we can obtain the projection of any execution of Pr
starting from ¾r by su®(E0vjcs) where E
0
v 2 ¦(¾r) and E0v starts from a legitimate con¯guration
of Pv.
For any E0v 2 ¦(¾r), p takes the state R(sp) in some con¯guration ¾p and q takes the state
R(sq) in some con¯guration ¾q. For contradiction, assume that ¾p and ¾q do not coincide in any
execution E0v 2 ¦(¾r). If R(sp) and R(sq) are concurrent states, then there exists at least one
execution in ¦(¾r) such that these two states coincide in one con¯guration. However, if there
is no such execution in ¦(¾r), then there exists some read/write causality between R(sp) and
R(sq). Thus, R(sp) and R(sq) are not concurrent states in Pv and this con°icts with Remark 3.
Thus, there exists some execution E¤v 2 ¦(¾r) such that R(sp) and R(sq) coincide in a con-
¯guration ¾v. Because ¾r is a cs-legitimate con¯guration of Pr, ¾v is a legitimate con¯guration
of Pv.
We considered that the number of faulty processes is two, but when the number of faulty
processes is bigger than two, we can conclude in the same way. 2
In Er, the fault corrupts some processes and changes the con¯guration from ¾r to ¾0r. This
corresponds to that in E¤v , the fault corrupts some processes and changes the con¯guration from
¾v to ¾0v. If the number of faulty processes is not larger than the maximum number of faulty
processes that Pv guarantees fault-containment, the execution of Pv after the corruption shows
a recovery of fault-containment and Er also shows the recovery of fault-containment.
When a fault corrupts some processes, the corrupted process cannot provide causal simulation
immediately after the corruption. For example, common variables at a faulty process may change
after the corruption because non-common variables were also corrupted by the fault. In this
case, common variables may °utter and the state of that process in the projection may also
°utter. However, we can ignore this repetition of °uttering states if the repetition is ¯nite and
the °uttering states do not a®ect other processes in the projection: any neighbor in Pv does not
change its state according to the °uttering states at a faulty process.
Let R0(Er) be obtained from R(Er) by replacing some local states that appear consecutively
and immediately after each faulty action with the state that follows the last replaced state.
R0(Er) is not uniquely de¯ned by R(Er). Figure 5.5 shows an example of R0(Er) where the
state x at process q is replaced with the following state e.
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(a) R(Er) for execution Er of Pr (b) R0(Er)
Figure 5.5: An example of R0(Er)
In R0(Er), the replaced states do not a®ect other processes in the projection while the
replacing state may a®ect other processes in the projection. R0(Er) enables the simulating
protocol Pr to have other variables than common variables since it may take some steps (or
rounds) for Pr to recover both common and non-common variables after the corruption. Clearly,
Remark 5 holds when we use R0(Er) instead of R(Er).
De¯nition 11 Causal Simulation of Fault-containing Protocols
A protocol Pr de¯ned for a topology Tr provides a causal simulation of another fault-containing
protocol Pv de¯ned for a topology Tv (with the same process set as Tr) on a locally shared memory
model i® for any execution Er of Pr starting from any cs-legitimate con¯guration where all faulty
actions occur in the ¯rst step and all the other actions are correct ones, there exists an execution
Ev of Pv such that Ev starts from a legitimate con¯guration of Pv and a fault corrupts the same
processes at a time and there exists R0(Er) that we obtain from su®(Evjcs).
If Pr satis¯es both De¯nitions 10 and 11 for fault-containing self-stabilizing protocol Pv,
Pr provides the causal simulation of Pv preserving the self-stabilization property and fault-
containment property of Pv.
Causal simulation preserves the behavior of each process and the read/write causality of
original execution. When a fault corrupts some processes in a cs-legitimate con¯guration of Pr,
causal simulation guarantees there exists some execution of Pv that experiences the corruption
of the same process set at a time. Consequently, for a fault-containing self-stabilizing protocols
Pv, causal simulation guarantees the fault containment property if the number of corrupted
processes is smaller than or equal to the number for which Pv guarantees fault containment.
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Figure 5.6: Local routing function at p
5.3 Causal Simulation Framework
We de¯ne protocol RET for a tree. We show that it provides a causal simulation of a uni-
directional ring protocol on the tree and preserves the fault-containment of the ring protocol
(Theorem 5).
We embed a vertex bijective ring on a tree. Our local routing function is similar to Arora's
paper [2]. Each process p is part of the data in ±p virtual links and maintains a local routing
function fp(). For q 2 Np[fpg, fp(q) returns some process in Np or p to which p relays the data
from q: fp(q) = r with r 2 Np [ fpg if p needs to forward to r the data from q. The inverse of
fp(q), f¡1p (q), returns p or some neighbor of p from which p should relay to q: f¡1p (q) = r with
r 2 Np [ fpg if p should read from r the data for q. The following relation always holds (see
Figure 5.6): fp(q) = r , f¡1p (r) = q.
The routing function fp() at each process p is de¯ned as follows. Let Np[0] represent p's
parent on the tree and Np[i] (1 · i < ±p) represent p's children (thus, Np[i] (0 · i < ±p) is
constant). At the root process r, Nr[0] =? and Nr[±r] 6=? (±r ¸ 1).
1. For the root process r (Nr[0] =?, Nr[±r] 6=?),
fr(q) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Nr[1] if q = r and r has a child
(Nr[1] is the ¯rst child of r)
Nr[0] if q = r and r has no children
Nr[i+ 1] if q = Nr[i] and 1 · i < ±r
r if q = Nr[±r]
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2. For a non-root, even-level process p,
fp(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Np[1] if q = p and p has a child
(Np[1] if the ¯rst child of p)
Np[0] if q = p and p has no children
p if q = Np[0]
Np[i+ 1] if q = Np[i] and 1 · i < ±p ¡ 1
Np[0] if p has a child and q = Np[±p ¡ 1]
3. For an odd-level process p,
fp(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Np[0] if q = p
Np[1] if q = Np[0] and p has a child
(Np[1] is the ¯rst child of p)
p if q = Np[0] and p has no children
Np[i+ 1] if q = Np[i] and 1 · i < ±p ¡ 1
p if p has a child and q = Np[±p ¡ 1]
For process c in Figure 5.2(c), fc(a) = g, fc(g) = h, fc(h) = c, fc(c) = a.
A virtual link of vertex bijective ring consists of at most three (tree) links and at most two
intermediate processes. These intermediate processes relay the data between endpoints in a
store-and-forward manner. We consider the case of a virtual link along which the intermediate
processes are corrupted but the endpoints are not. If an endpoint is corrupted by the fault, the
virtual process of that endpoint is also corrupted. If we allow the corrupted data to be read at
the endpoint of the virtual link, the fault may spread in the entire system unhindered.
To prevent unlimited propagation of corrupted data from an intermediate process to an
endpoint process of a virtual link, we synchronize the communication of a process with its
immediate neighbors. Between two consecutive communications of a process p with its neighbor
q, we force p to communicate with all its other neighbors. To this end, we use the mechanism
of link alternator [45]. There are also tree synchronizers [32, 7], however these synchronizers
are not snap-stabilizing because a faulty process can communicate twice consecutively with the
same neighbor before communicating with other neighbors.
The link alternator is snap-stabilizing and ensures synchronization immediately after the
fault. In the link alternator protocol, each process p has a pointer compp indicating a process
in Np. When two neighboring processes point at each other (e.g. compp = q and compq = p for
some process q 2 Np), the two processes can communicate. After that they change the pointer to
another neighbor. The ordering of the neighbors is determined by the topology and each process
can communicate with its neighbors in a round robin fashion. The link alternator protocol is
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snap-stabilizing; every con¯guration of the protocol is legitimate. Starting from an arbitrary
initial con¯guration, the protocol ensures that each process can communicate with its neighbors
in a round robin fashion. Thus, in every execution, between two consecutive communications
with the same neighbor, each process communicates with other neighbors.
5.3.1 Causal Simulation Protocol RET
In a locally shared memory model, a process executes the following three steps: (1) reads the
local variable(s) of the immediate neighbor(s), (2) executes some local computation, (3) writes
into its own local variable(s). When process p receives ¯ve pieces of data from its predecessor in
the virtual ring, p computes majority of them. The result is then delivered at p that corresponds
to read action in the virtual ring. Then, p executes the computation of the original protocol and
updates the common variables, which corresponds to a write action to common variables in the
virtual ring.
Protocol RET (Protocol 5:3:1) uses the following variables. Each process p has a variable !p
used by the ring protocol. 1. Variable cp denotes the remaining number of times p should read
the data from its predecessor in the ring (through possible intermediate processes) and cp takes
a value in the set f0; : : : ; 4g. In the original ring protocol, process p updates !p by executing a
generic action called Action(). Action() has two parameters: the current content of p, !p, and
the data relayed from its predecessor in the ring. By default, Action(!p;?) = !p (if no data is
delivered at p, then do nothing).
For the routed data, process p uses the variables:
1. wyp(q), called contents table, keeps the data sent by f¡1p (q) through p that needs to be
relayed to process q, q 2 Np [ fpg. If f¡1p (q) = p then wyp(q) = !p.
2. wzp, called cache table, keeps the latest ¯ve data relayed from p's predecessor in the ring.
Two operations are de¯ned on the table: append(wzp; w) appends w to wzp, and ext(wzp) returns
the ¯ve entries.
Function maj(wzp) returns the majority of ext(wzp) or ? if there is no majority. Predicate
commp(q) is controlled by the communication synchronizer and is true when process p can
communicate with some neighbor q, q 2 Np.
Action C1 corrects the value of the counter cp (if outside the range [0,: : : ; 4], then it is set
to 4), and also ensures that the entry wyp(fp(p)) of the contents table is equal to !p (fp(p) is the
neighbor of p towards p's successor in the ring).
Action A1 simulates the ring communication on the tree. Condition fp(q) 6= p implies that
1For simplicity, we use one common variable for each process but without loss of generality this can be seen
as a composite of multiple common variables.
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Protocol 5.3.1 RET (Ring Embedding protocol on an arbitrary rooted Tree)
Predicate OK c(p) ´ (0 · cp < 5) ^ wyp(fp(p)) = !p
Actions for any process p
C1 cp < 0 _ cp ¸ 5 _ wyp(fp(p)) 6= !p ¡! cp = 4; wyp(fp(p)) = !p
A1 OK c(p) ^ commp(q) ¡!
// read from q
iffp(q) 6= p then wyp(fp(q)) = wyq(p)
else
append(wzp; wyq(p))
ifcp > 0 then cp ¡¡
else
!p Ã Action(!p;maj(wzp))
wyp(fp(p)) = !p
cp = 4
the data read from q needs to be relayed further. When the counter cp is 0 the majority is
applied (function maj) to the content of !zp relayed from its predecessor in the virtual ring. If
the result is not empty, we say that the result is delivered at p. Then, p executes Action() and
updates !p with the result. The counter cp is reset to 4 and the new content of !p is relayed to
its successor in the ring.
5.3.2 Correctness Proof of RET
For some process p, let q and r be its predecessor and successor in the ring.
In any execution of RET, if q changes !q to s with Action(!q;maj(!
z
p)) and no fault occurs
at q during !q = s, then p stores at least ¯ve s's in !
z
p (Proposition 1). Independent of the value
of cp at the time q changes !q to s, if p stores ¯ve s's in !
z
p, then s is delivered at p (Proposition
2). A con¯guration ¾ of RET is a legitimate con¯guration i® in any execution starting from ¾
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 hold.
A legitimate con¯guration is reached in ¯nite time once each process has reset its counter
cp to 4 at least once (Lemma 15). The time complexity depends on the synchronizer used for
communication between neighboring processes.
Since dilation is three, a fault at the intermediate processes on a virtual link may corrupt
5.3. CAUSAL SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 63
  	







 ff
flfi
ffi
fi 
 ! "
#
fi
      

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 fi
ffi
fi 
 ! "
#
fi
Figure 5.7: Fault at p on the virtual ring
at most two pieces of data out of ¯ve, thus by applying a majority function the corrupted data
is eliminated. If neither q nor p are faulty and !q = s, then either data s is delivered at p or
is lost (but no other data is delivered) if some fault occurs at the intermediate processes on the
virtual link between q and p (Lemma 16).
The fault at p can corrupt p's variables: !p, cp, w
y
p, and w
z
p. Assume that the fault had
changed !p from a value s to a value t 6= s, cp to some value in the set f0; : : : ; 4g (Action C1
corrects it otherwise), and the top ¯ve entries of wzp are w1; : : : ; w5 (Figure 5.7). The contents
table wyp is correctable: the entries for all q 6= fp(p) in the contents table wyp will be corrected
(Lemma 16). The entry wyp(fp(p)) (data that p forwards to its successor in the ring) is equal to
!p (Action C1 corrects it otherwise).
In the ring, process p reads the contents of process q that is a value s. This corresponds in
the tree that p stores ¯ve s's in !zp (Proposition 1). Propositions 1 and 2 deal with fault-free
cases. We show that a fault at p that occurred during this communication may a®ect it at most
twice: Only data s and another data that p took before s may be lost, but no data before that
or after s is lost and the state of p in the virtual ring, !p, is corrupted at most once by the
fault in the virtual ring (Lemma 17). We can then conclude that a fault may cause a loss of at
most three pieces of data per virtual link (Lemma 18). Lemmas 16, 17, and 18 cover all possible
timings of faults for a virtual link. Then, we will show the data loss is acceptable in the causal
simulation of ring protocols (Theorem 5).
Proposition 1 If process q changes its content !q to s by Action(!q;maj(!
z
p)), and p is the
successor of q in the virtual ring, then p stores at least ¯ve s's in !zp.
Proof. Whenever the contents of q (stored in !q and w
y
q(fq(q))) is changed, the counter cq
is reset to 4. Whenever the current value of wyq(fq(q)) is read by process fq(q), the counter is
gradually decremented to 0. Each intermediate process between q and p relays s every time it
reads s. Thus the current content of q is relayed in the tree at least ¯ve times and p stores the
content of p at least ¯ve times in !zp. (It may be relayed and stored more than ¯ve times if the
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Figure 5.8: Faults at intermediate processes on the virtual link (q; p)
content of !q remains unchanged.) 2
Proposition 2 If process p stores ¯ve s's in !zp, then p delivers s.
Proof. Let c0p be the content of cp when the ¯rst s is stored in !
z
p. Majority is applied after
(c0p + 1)th s is stored in !
z
p. If c0p · 1, then the next majority will be s since (5 ¡ (c0p + 1)) s's
are stored in !zp. Else (c0p > 1), the current majority is s. 2
When the majority is s, p delivers s. This corresponds to a situation in the ring where p
reads its predecessor q's state s. Then p executes Action(!p; s) and updates !p with the resulting
content. This corresponds to a situation in the ring where p executes local computation and
writes to its local variables.
Lemma 15 Starting from an arbitrary initial con¯guration, RET reaches in O(¢) rounds
(where ¢ is the maximum degree of a node in the tree) a con¯guration such that Propositions 1
and 2 hold for every process in every con¯guration thereafter.
Proof. Let p and q be two processes such that p is the successor of q. After process q has reset
cq to 4 at least once, !q changes when the process fq(q) has read the content of !q ¯ve times.
Since p has reset cp to 4, p applies majority once during the acquisition of s.
Propositions 1 and 2 hold for every process. In a ¯nite time, each process executes C1 or
A1 of Protocol 5.3.1. By using link alternator, a process communicates with one neighbor every
O(¢) rounds. Thus, O(¢) rounds are necessary. 2
Lemma 16 If neither process q nor p is faulty, and !q = b, then p delivers the value b if no
fault occurs at the intermediate processes, otherwise the value b may be lost, but no ¯ctitious
data is delivered at p.
Proof. The distance between q and p must be at least two, but no more than three. Let u be
the next process after q on the tree towards p: fq(q) = u. (Figure 5.8.)
Let a be the majority at p before the ¯rst b is stored at p. Let c be the next content of !q
after b.
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If none of the intermediate processes between q and p in the tree is faulty and !q = b, then p
stores ¯ve b's in !zp (Proposition 1). Majority is applied at process p when cp becomes 0. Data
b is either the current, or the next majority (Proposition 2).
If u is faulty, and the fault at u a®ected wyu(fu(q)) such that w
y
u(fu(q)) 6= wyq(u), then data
b that relayed to p from q through u is corrupted.
So, we have two cases:
Case A) The distance between q and p is two (Figure 5.8(a)).
By the communication synchronizer, after p stores a from u, u copies the correct data from
q and corrects the entry in the content table. So, next time u relays to p correct data. So,
instead of the sequence b b b b b, process p stores four b's and one faulty data f . We have
then ¯ve cases, depending on the position of the faulty data.
1. Process p stores f b b b b in !zp (Figure 5.9(b)). If cp = 2 when f is stored, then the
next majority will be ?, followed by c, and b is lost. Otherwise data b is delivered at
p.
2. Process p stores b f b b b in !zp (Figure 5.9(c)). Same as Case 1.
3. Process p stores b b f b b in !zp (Figure 5.9(d)). Same as Case 1.
4. Process p stores b b b f b in !zp (Figure 5.9(e)). If cp = 1 when the ¯rst b is stored, then
the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at
p.
5. Process p stores b b b b f in !zp (Figure 5.9(f)). If cp = 1 when the ¯rst b is stored then
the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at
p.
Case B) The distance between q and p is three (Figure 5.8(b)).
Let u; v be the intermediate processes in the tree topology, and assume that either they
are both faulty. After p stores a corrupted data from v, v copies another corrupted data
from u that p also stores the next time p and v communicates. Then, u copies the correct
data from q, so next time u relays to v the correct data.
So, instead of the sequence b b b b b, process p stores three b's and two consecutive faulty
data f1 and f2. Let c c c c c be the sequence to follow the sequence of b. We have ¯ve
cases, depending on the position of the faulty data.
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Figure 5.9: Majority values at process p
1. Process p stores f1 f2 b b b in !
z
p (Figure 5.9(g)). If cp 2 f2; 3g when f1 is stored, then
the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at
p.
2. Process p stores b f1 f2 b b in !
z
p (Figure 5.9(h)). Same as Case 1.
3. Process p stores b b f1 f2 b in !
z
p (Figure 5.9(i)). Same as Case 1.
4. Process p stores b b b f1 f2 in !
z
p (Figure 5.9(j)). If cp 2 f0; 1g when the ¯rst b is
stored, then the next majority (after b's) will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost.
Otherwise b is delivered at p.
5. Process p stores b b b b f1 f2 c c c c (Figure 5.9(k)). If cp 2 f1; 2g when the ¯rst b
is stored, then the next majority (after b's) will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost.
Otherwise b is delivered at p.
Consequently, if a fault occurred at some intermediate process(es) when p was about to
collect ¯ve b's, in the worst case, instead of ¯ve b's, p will store three b's and two faulty data.
Nevertheless, the corrupted data is not enough for a majority, thus data b can be either delivered
at p or lost. 2
Lemma 17 If !q changes from a to b and the fault at p occurred after p stored ¯ve a's then
data a and b may be lost, but no data relayed before a or after b is lost. The contents of p, !p,
is corrupted at most once by the fault in the ring and no ¯ctitious data is delivered at p instead
of b.
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Figure 5.10: Fault at p in the virtual ring (Data a was delivered before the fault.)
Proof. Let nb be the number of b's still left to be stored by p after the fault at p (1 · nb · 5)
and c0p be the value of cp before the fault.
After p stored ¯ve a's, p would receive at most two more b's before p delivers a. So, we have
three cases depending on the value of c0p.
1. c0p = 0. If there was no fault, p would have computed majority after p stored one b and
!zp = fa; a; a; a; bg (nb = 5) or fa; a; a; b; bg (nb = 4). Thus, a was not delivered at p before
the fault.
2. c0p = 1. If there was no fault, p would have computed majority after p stored two b's and
!zp = fa; a; a; b; bg (nb = 5). Thus, a was not delivered at p before the fault.
3. c0p > 1 The majority has already computed on !
z
p that contains at least three a's and a
was delivered at p.
We consider two cases: Case A) when a was delivered at p before the fault and Case B)
when a was not delivered at p before the fault.
Case A) Data a is delivered at p before the fault
Let the fault changes !p from s to t. We have ¯ve cases, depending on the value of cp after
the fault.
Case cp = 0. A majority function is applied to w
z
p after one b is stored in !
z
p.
Let w = maj(fb; w1; : : : ; w4g; 5). We have three cases, depending on the value of w:
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1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t), and r stores ¯ve t's from p. By
Proposition 2, t is delivered at r.
If nb < 4 then p will store at most two other b's (since one b was already stored),
thus too few b's to be able to be the next majority at p. Thus b is lost. This
corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p from s to
t, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(a)).
Else (nb ¸ 4) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered
at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p
from s to t, but p reads b (Figure 5.10(b)).
2. w 6= ?^w = b. Then !p is changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By
Proposition 2, x is delivered at r.
If nb < 4 then p will store too few b to be able to be the next majority at p. Thus
b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p
from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(c)).
Else (nb ¸ 4) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to y = Action(x; b), and r stores ¯vem's. By Proposition 2, y is delivered
at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from
s to x, but p reads b (Figure 5.10(d)).
3. w 6= ? ^ w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z = Action(t; w), and r stores ¯ve z's.
By Proposition 2, z is delivered at r.
If nb < 4 then p will store too few b to be able to be the next majority at p. Thus
b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p
from s to z, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(e)).
Else (nb ¸ 4) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p
is changed to m = Action(z; b), and r stores ¯ve m's. By Proposition 2, m is
delivered at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to z, but p reads b (Figure 5.10(f)).
Case cp = 1. Thus r reads one t from p.
If nb = 1 then p stores one b and after that p stores another data q relays after b. Let
c be that data and w = maj(fc; b; w1; w2; w3g; 5). Based on w, we have three cases.
1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t), and r stores ¯ve t's. By Propo-
sition 2, t is delivered at r. The next majority will be c and !p is changed to
Action(t; c). This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to t and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(a)).
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2. w 6= ?^w = b. Then !p is changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By
Proposition 2, x is delivered at r. The next majority will be c. This corresponds
in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s to x and caused b
to be lost (Figure 5.10(c)).
3. w 6= ?^w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z = Action(t; w), and r stores ¯ve z's. By
Proposition 2, z is delivered at r. The next majority will be c. This corresponds
in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p from s to z and caused
b to be lost (Figure 5.10(e)).
If nb > 1, let w = maj(fb; b; w1; w2; w3g; 5). Based on w, we have three cases.
1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t), and r stores ¯ve t's. By Proposi-
tion 2, t is delivered at r.
If 1 < nb < 5 then p will store at most two more b's from q (already two b's have
been stored) thus too few b's to be able to be the next majority at p. Thus b is
lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p
from s to t, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(a)).
Else (nb = 5) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered
at r. Since one t is not enough to be majority at r, this corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Figure
5.10(c)).
2. w 6= ? ^ w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z = Action(t; w), and r stores ¯ve z's.
By Proposition 2, z is delivered at r.
If 1 < nb < 5 then p will store too few b to be able to be the next majority at p.
Thus b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to z, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(e)).
Else (nb = 5) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p
is changed to m = Action(z; b), and r stores ¯ve m's. By Proposition 2, m is
delivered at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to z, but p reads b (Figure 5.10(f)).
3. w 6= ?^w = b. Then !p is changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By
Proposition 2, x is delivered at r.
If 1 < nb < 5 then p will store too few b to be able to be the next majority at p.
Thus b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(c)).
Else (nb = 5) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
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changed to y = Action(x; b), and r stores ¯ve y's. By Proposition 2, y is delivered
at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p
from s to x, but p reads b (Figure 5.10(d)).
Case cp = 2. Thus r stores two t's from p.
If nb < 3 then p stores at least one b and after that p stores another data q relays
after b. Let c be that data and w = maj(fc; c; b; w1; w2g; 5). Based on w we have
three cases.
1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t), and r stores ¯ve t's. By Propo-
sition 2, t is delivered at r. The next majority will be c and !p is changed to
Action(t; c). This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that
changed !p from s to t and caused b to be lost (Figure 5.10(a)).
2. w 6= ?^w = b. Then !p is changed to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By
Proposition 2, x is delivered at r. The next majority will be c. This corresponds
in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p from s to x and caused
b to be lost (Figure 5.10(c)).
3. w 6= ?^w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z = Action(t; w), and r stores ¯ve z's. By
Proposition 2, z is delivered at r. The next majority will be c. This corresponds
in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed !p from s to z and caused
b to be lost (Figure 5.10(e)).
Else (nb ¸ 3) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed
to x = Action(t; b), and r stores ¯ve x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered at r. Since
two t's is not enough to make majority at r, this corresponds in the virtual ring as
a fault at process p that changed !p from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Figure
5.10(c)).
Case cp = 3. Thus r stores three t's from p. Then follow the same as Case cp = 2.
Case cp = 4. Thus r stores four t's from r. Then follow the same as Case cp = 2.
Case B) Data a is not delivered at p before the fault.
Thus, nb ¸ 4. Let the fault changes !p from s0 to t0. We have ¯ve cases, depending on the
value of cp after the fault.
Case cp = 0. A majority function is applied to w
z
p after one b is stored in !
z
p.
Let w = maj(fb; w1; : : : ; w4g; 5). We have three cases, depending on the value of w:
1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t0), and r stores ¯ve t0 from p. By
Proposition 2, data t0 is delivered at r. Since nb ¸ 4, the next majority at p is
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Figure 5.11: Fault at p in the virtual ring (Data a was not delivered before the fault.)
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b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed to x0 = Action(t0; b), and r stores ¯ve
x0. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from
s0 to t0, and caused a to be lost but p reads b. (Figure 5.11(b)).
2. w 6= ? ^ w = a. Then !p is changed to x00 = Action(t0; a), and r stores ¯ve x00.
By Proposition 2, data x00 is delivered at r. Since nb ¸ 4, the next majority at p
is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed to y00 = Action(x00; b), and r stores
¯ve y00. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p
from s0 to x00, and caused a to be lost but p reads b (Figure 5.11(d)).
3. w 6= ?^w = b. Then !p is changed to x0 = Action(t0; b), and r stores ¯ve x0. By
Proposition 2, data x0 is delivered at r. Since nb ¸ 4, the next majority at p is
b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed to y0 = Action(x0; b), and r stores ¯ve
y0. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from
s0 to x0, and caused a to be lost but p reads b (Figure 5.11(f)).
4. w 6= ?^w 6= a^w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z0 = Action(t0; w), and r stores ¯ve
z0. By Proposition 2, data z0 is delivered at r. Since nb ¸ 4, the next majority at
p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed to m0 = Action(z0; b), and r stores
¯ve m0. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p
from s0 to z0, and caused a to be lost but p reads b (Figure 5.11(h)).
Case cp = 1. Thus r reads one t from p.
Since nb ¸ 4, let w = maj(fb; b; w1; w2; w3g; 5). Depending on w, we have three cases.
1. w = ?. Thus !p remains unchanged (value t0), and r stores ¯ve t0. By Proposition
2, data t0 is delivered at r. Next two cases can occur:
(i) If 4 · nb < 5 then follow the same as Case A. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to t0, and caused data a and b to
be lost (Figure 5.11(a)).
(ii) If nb = 5 then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to x0 = Action(t0; b), and r stores ¯ve x0. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x0, and caused a to be lost but
p reads a (Figure 5.11(b)).
2. w 6= ? ^ w = a. Then !p is changed to x00 = Action(t0; a), and r stores ¯ve x00.
By Proposition 2, data x00 is delivered at r. Next two cases can occur:
(i) If 4 · nb < 5 then follow the same as Case A. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x00, and caused a and b to be
lost (Figure 5.11(c)).
(ii) If nb = 5 then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
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changed to y00 = Action(x00; b), and r stores ¯ve y00. This corresponds in the
virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x00, and caused a to be
lost but p reads b (Figure 5.11(d)).
3. w 6= ? ^ w = b. Then !p is changed to x0 = Action(t0; b), and r stores ¯ve x0.
By Proposition 2, data x0 is delivered at r. Next two cases can occur:
(i) If 4 · nb < 5 then follow the same as Case A. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x0, and caused a and b to be
lost (Figure 5.11(e)).
(ii) If nb = 5 then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to y0 = Action(x0; b), and r stores ¯ve y0. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x0, and caused a to be lost but
p reads b (Figure 5.11(f)).
4. w 6= ? ^ w 6= a ^ w 6= b. Then !p is changed to z0 = Action(t0; w), and r stores
¯ve z0. By Proposition 2, data z0 is delivered at r. Next two cases can occur:
(i) If 4 · nb < 5 then follow the same as Case A. This corresponds in the virtual
ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to z0, and caused a and b to be
lost (Figure 5.11(g)).
(ii) If nb = 5 then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, !p is
changed to m0 = Action(z0; b), and r stores ¯ve m0. This corresponds in the
virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to z0, and caused a to be
lost but p reads b (Figure 5.11(h)).
Case cp = 2. Thus r stores two t's from p. Since nb ¸ 4, the next majority at p is b.
Thus b is delivered at p, !p is changed to x0 = Action(t0; b), and r stores ¯ve x0. This
corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed !p from s0 to x0, and
caused a and b to be lost (Figure 5.11(e)).
Case cp = 3. Thus r stores three t's from p. Then follow the same as Case cp = 2.
Case cp = 4. Thus r stores four t's from r. Then follow the same as Case cp = 2.
2
Lemma 18 If q changes !q from b to c after q changes !q from a to b and the fault at p and
intermediate processes occurred after p stored ¯ve a's then data a, b, and c may be lost, but no
data relayed before a or after c is lost. The contents of p, !p, is corrupted at most once by the
fault in the ring and no ¯ctitious data is delivered at p.
Proof. From Lemma 16 the data relayed when the fault corrupts the intermediate processes
can be lost. During the acquisition of b's at p, data b or c is relayed and can be corrupted. From
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Lemma 17 data a and b can be lost by the fault at p. Thus, at most three messages are lost by
the fault at p and intermediate processes. 2
Theorem 5 Protocol RET provides a causal simulation of a ring protocol executed in a tree,
and also preserves the self-stabilization and the fault-containment of the original ring protocol.
Proof. Let A be a protocol on a ring and !p be the local state of some process p in A. The
set of local variables at p in RET consists of !p, cp, w
y
p, and w
z
p. The condition of De¯nition 10
is satis¯ed: From Lemma 15 the system eventually reaches a con¯guration ¾ such that after ¾
Proposition 1 and 2 holds. In A, if a process p reads the state a of its predecessor q, executes local
computation and writes its local variables (updates !p), then in RET the following sequence of
execution steps occurs: a is delivered at p and p executes Action(!p; a) and writes the results
to !p. From Proposition 1 and 2, this always holds after ¾ if no fault occurs.
From Lemma 16, 17, and 18, when some fault corrupts p and intermediate processes on the
virtual link towards p, at most three data relayed to p is lost and at most one data for each
neighbor of p is lost. A lost data corresponds to a state of some process in the virtual ring that
was not read by its successor. Thus, we conclude that the condition of De¯nition 11 is satis¯ed.
2
5.3.3 Performance Evaluation
The execution of ring protocols in the virtual ring is slowed down because the dilation of vertex
bijective ring is three and the communication synchronization mechanism for RET forces a
process to communicate with its neighbors in a speci¯c order. The slowdown of protocol Pr for
a simulated protocol Pv is the maximum number of rounds in Pr that are necessary for one read
action of Pv. Since the dilation is constant, we show the slowdown of RET is proportional to
the maximum degree of some process in the tree.
Theorem 6 Slowdown of RET for a ring protocol executed in a tree of maximum degree ¢ is
8¢.
Proof. Let p and q be neighboring processes in the tree such that fp(q) = p. After p commu-
nicates with q, the synchronization mechanism forces p to communicate with other neighbors
than q before communicating with q again. In [45] it is proved that starting from any arbitrary
initial con¯guration, after ¢d rounds where d is the diameter of the graph, it is guaranteed that
for any process p, p can communicate with its neighbor q k times in k¢ rounds.
One virtual link consists of at most three links of the tree. Thus, at most 3k¢ rounds are
necessary to relay k pieces of data between endpoint processes. For one piece of data to be
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Figure 5.12: The delay caused by RET
delivered at an endpoint process, ¯ve pieces of identical data should be relayed and the data
relayed is pipelined (Figure 5.12). Thus, for one data to be relayed, (5+3)¢ rounds is necessary
and the slowdown of RET is 8¢. 2
5.4 Example of 1-fault-containing Leader Election
We show how protocol RET can be used to design a 1-fault-containing leader election protocol
in arbitrary trees from the 1-fault-containing leader election protocol of Ghosh and Gupta [22]
on bidirectional rings.
Let LE be the Ghosh and Gupta's leader election protocol that selects the node with the
maximum ID as the leader. We present a causal simulation of LE on arbitrary trees that is
1-fault-containing and is obtained by combining RET and LE.
We denote the predecessor of p with prep.
In LE each process p has a unique ID idp, and other variables as follows:
1. maxp is the maximum ID known by p.
2. distp is the distance from the leader on the counter-clockwise ring.
3. qp 2 f0; 1g indicates whether p asked the predecessor prep (qp = 1) if prep has to change
maxprep or disdistp .
4. ap 2 f0; 1;?g indicates whether p answered the question from the successor; ap = 1 (respec-
tively, 0) if it has (respectively, does not have) to change maxp or distp; if it has not answered
then ap = ?.
5. cp stores a copy of aprep
Let q be the process with the maximum ID among all processes in V , and let K be the value
of idq.
In a legitimate con¯guration of LE, the following conditions hold:
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Figure 5.13: Embedding forward and backward rings
(i) For all process p 2 V , maxp = K, and
(ii) distq = 0 and for any other process p, distp = distprep + 1.
LE is designed for bidirectional rings and RET for unidirectional rings. RET uses the
routing function from Section 5.3 on what we call the forward ring (counter-clockwise preorder-
postorder traversal). The reverse of the routing function provides communication on what we
call the backward ring (clockwise preorder-postorder traversal).
Each process p has to evaluate the guards of LE and execute the corresponding actions with
the value that p has just delivered in the virtual ring. The guards of LE contains the state of
p's predecessor and successor. However, when process p executes Action() with RET+, p has
delivered the data just from its predecessor.
To evaluate and execute the guarded actions of LE with the latest data that p has just
delivered from its predecessor and successor, we divide LE into two distinct set of guarded
commands, LE+ and LE¡. The guards and actions in LE+ at process p contains just p's local
variables and its predecessor's variables while the guards and actions in LE¡ contains just p's
local variables and its successor's variables. We obtain LE by the union of LE+ and LE¡.
The guarded commands in LE+ are executed when RET+ executes Action() and the guarded
commands in LE¡ are executed when RET¡ executes Action().
While RET+ and RET¡ use di®erent counters, cache tables, and contents tables, the con-
tents of both rings are common: at process p, !+p = !
¡
p = (idp;maxp; distp; qp; ap; cp). Whenever
the distributed daemon selects process p, RET+ and RET¡ are executed consecutively. When
RET+ (respectively, RET¡) executes Action(), LE+ (respectively, LE¡) is executed. We call
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Figure 5.14: Leader election in the bidirectional ring
this implementation as BRET (Bidirectional RET ).
In BRET, a selected process p may execute at most two actions of LE : one is executed by
RET+ and the other is executed by RET¡. This corresponds to the case that p is selected by
distributed daemon successively in the original execution of LE on a bidirectional ring.
In other cases, p may execute the actions of LE+ several times without executing LE¡.
Since we adopt the model that allows an enabled process to execute one of the enabled actions,
this corresponds to the case that p does not select the enabled guard of LE¡.
The following lemma holds immediately.
Lemma 19 For any execution Er of BRET, there is an execution Ev of LE such that Er is
obtained by a causal shift of Ev.
Thus, BRET provides a causal simulation of LE.
For example, consider the case where BRET is executed on the tree in Figure 5.13(a). The
forward and the backward ring of the tree are shown in Figure 5.13(b) and 5.13(c). The forward
ring enables each process to read its predecessor's state and the backward ring enables each
process to read its successor's state. The predecessor for process a is c (Figure 5.13(b)) and the
successor for a is d (Figure 5.13(e)).
Figure 5.14 shows a legitimate con¯guration of the leader election when ida = 3, idb = 6,
idc = 2, idd = 5, ide = 1, and idf = 4. Let process c be corrupted by a fault and after the fault,
the contents of c, !c is idc = 2, maxc = 5, distc = 0, qc = 0, ac = ?, cc = 0 and we denote this
by (2; 5; 0; 0;?; 0).
Clearly, not only the state of process c in the virtual ring but also the data in the contents
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table at c can be corrupted. Because c is on the virtual link (b; f) of the forward ring and on the
virtual link (f; b) of the backward ring, process b and f can read at most one corrupted data.
This is eliminated by the majority computation at each process.
The corruption at c makes c to set qc = 1 and a to set qa = 1. No other processes change
their question °ags. This is because each process checks the state of the predecessor ¯rst. In
this case, maxb 6= maxc at process c and maxc 6= maxa at process a.
Let us concentrate on the forward ring. If the fault changes c+c = 3, then c executes BRET
after it reads the content at f once. When the majority of the cache table may be di®erent
from the content at f , c may change its content with incorrect data: e.g. (2; 5; 0; 0;?; 1). The
successor of c, a reads the content (2; 5; 0; 0;?; 0) just once and the state cannot be delivered
at a. Thus, (2; 5; 0; 0;?; 0) can be ignored in the causal simulation and for a, the fault seems
to change the contents at c to (2; 5; 0; 0;?; 1). After that, c corrects correct data from f and
executes BRET and executes recovery actions.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we proposed protocol RET that preserves the fault-containment property of a
ring protocol executed on an arbitrary rooted tree. Our protocol ensures that along any link of
a virtual ring embedded on a tree, there is no data corruption, neither data creation. Because
the delay of each virtual link di®ers from others, RET cannot trace the global con¯gurations of
the original execution. We introduced causal simulation that preserves the read/write causality
of the original execution. Causal simulation is strong enough to execute the same task as the
original protocol for any reactive and non-reactive tasks as long as the safety property of the
task is de¯ned by the read/write causality. Because the safety properties of many reactive and
non-reactive tasks are de¯ned by the read/write causality, the proposed protocol RET is useful
in extending the application of existing fault-containing ring protocols.
Though protocol RET is designed in the locally shared memory model, it can be extended
to ring protocols written in message-passing model by considering a time-stamp to the data
sent along the virtual link embedded on a tree. The time-stamp will takes integer values in the
range 1 : : : 5. Also, the proposed communication mechanism can be used to embed virtual links
of other topology embeddings.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of the Results
In this dissertation, we focused on hierarchical design of fault-containing self-stabilizing proto-
cols. Hierarchical structure of protocols facilitates the design of new protocols and extends the
application of existing protocols. Fault-containing protocols have the power of adaptive self-
stabilization, i.e. they provide self-stabilization for large scale faults and fault-containment for
small scale faults. This adaptability is useful in practice because in real networks, catastrophic
faults rarely occur while small scale faults are more likely to occur frequently.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we proposed hierarchical composition techniques for fault-
containing protocols. The goal of the composition techniques is to preserve the fault-containment
property of source protocols. Our strategy RWFC is to control the execution of source protocols
and we utilized the fault-containment property of source protocols to control their execution. In
Chapter 3, we utilized the temporal containment property of source protocols and, as a compo-
nent of the composition protocol RWFC-LNS, we designed local neighborhood synchronizer LNS
that synchronizes only small number of processes around faulty processes for a short period of
time after a fault. In Chapter 4, we utilized the spatial containment property of source protocols
and, as a component of the composition protocol RWFC-IcD, we designed inconsistency detector
IcD that checks the inconsistency of source protocols. Though the component protocols (LNS
and IcD) impose some overhead on the composite protocol, the overhead is bounded by the
containment property of source protocols. Hence, the composite protocol preserves the spatial
and/or temporal containment property of source protocols at the cost of small overhead. The
composition framework for fault-containing protocols is important both theoretically and practi-
cally. We can design new fault-containing protocols easily at the top of existing fault-containing
protocols with the proposed composition framework. This is the ¯rst step in facilitating the
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design of new fault-tolerant distributed protocols.
In Chapter 5, we introduced ring embedding on an arbitrary rooted tree and proposed causal
simulation technique for fault-containing ring protocols on the embedded ring. The proposed
protocol RET embeds virtual links on the real topology and in the embedded ring there is
neither data corruption nor data creation. Because the delay of each virtual link is di®erent
from others, RET preserves read/write causality of original executions that is strong enough
to guarantee that the simulation executes the same task as the original execution. We call the
execution of the source protocol on the embedded ring causal simulation. The slowdown of the
simulation depends on the dilation of the embedding and our ring embedding has the dilation
of three. Hence, the simulation protocol simulates fault-containing ring protocols on a rooted
tree with a small slowdown. The proposed topology embedding demonstrates the possibility
of uniform framework based on topology embedding that extends the application of existing
fault-containing protocols.
6.2 Future Directions
Regarding the proposed methods for hierarchical design of fault-containing protocols, there exist
many issues of both theoretical interest and practical interest.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we discussed hierarchical composition of self-stabilizing proto-
cols that preserves the fault-containment property. The point is how to guarantee the recovery
of the lower protocol when the upper protocol starts its execution. In the proposed compo-
sition technique, we utilize the containment property of fault-containing protocols to control
the execution of source protocols, i.e. temporal containment property and spatial containment
property. Fault-containing protocols form one subclass of adaptive self-stabilizing protocols.
One extension of our work is to propose hierarchical composition technique for other adap-
tive self-stabilizing protocols preserving their own adaptability, e.g. time-adaptive stabilization,
superstabilization, local stabilization, and time-to-fault adaptive stabilization. To develop hier-
archical composition for adaptive self-stabilizing protocols, the adaptability of source protocols
can be used to guarantee the recovery of the lower protocol.
Another interesting issue in composing adaptive self-stabilizing protocols is to investigate
the trade-o® between the adaptability preserved in the composite protocol and the cost (e.g.
time and space) paid to preserve the adaptability of source protocols. The proposed composition
techniques guarantee that the lower protocol has recovered when the upper protocol starts its
execution. However, we can relax the condition by allowing the upper protocol to be executed
after some safety property holds in the lower protocol. This relaxed condition can make the
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composite protocol satisfy some safety property quickly. However, the critical issue is how to
bound the spread of the e®ect of faults.
In Chapter 5, we introduced one-to-one ring embedding on an arbitrary rooted tree and
proposed a simulation technique that preserves the fault-containment property simulated on the
embedded ring. We proposed a communication mechanism that realizes virtual links on the
real topology. Though this communication mechanism is implemented for ring embeddings, we
can apply this mechanism to any virtual link embedding with constant dilation. For example,
in a network clustering based on a maximal independent set, the maximum distance between
cluster heads is three and we can easily apply the proposed communication mechanism to realize
almost reliable communication between cluster heads. It is one of the interesting extensions for
our communication mechanism to seek for applications in real networks.
Another future work is to relax the communication model and fault model. Though the
proposed simulation technique is designed for locally shared memory model, the technique also
¯ts the message passing model. This is because each virtual link has di®erent but bounded
delay that corresponds to message passing model and channels with bounded delay. Fault
tolerance against Byzantine faults is well studied in the area of self-stabilization [5, 44, 46, 54].
By embedding multiple disjoint virtual links between two adjacent virtual processes, we can
realize communication mechanism with Byzantine fault tolerance. However, the problem is the
communication slowdown because the slowdown of the proposed communication mechanism
depends on the number of virtual links. Thus, the message duplication technique itself needs to
be improved for multiple virtual links. Adding Byzantine fault tolerance should be signi¯cant
improvement for our simulation technique because Byzantine fault is the strongest fault model.
To develop further methods for hierarchical structures of fault-tolerant distributed protocols,
it is important to examine other useful properties for implementing hierarchical structures. For
example, consider the stability in output of non-masking fault-tolerant protocols that guarantees
even when some faults or topology changes occur, the output of a protocol may change to adopt
them but the changes in the output are as small as possible. This stability in output can
prevent the application of the protocol from changing its con¯guration frequently according to
the unnecessary changes of the input. Adding these useful properties to existing fault-tolerant
protocols is important both theoretically and practically.
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